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ABSTRACT 
Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin's family to the jury 
verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the 
defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. 
Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family's 
emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal 
punishment-especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the 
Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why 
were-and are-they so upset that he did not? 
This Article will argue for three points. First, what fuels this kind 
of outrage is vengeance: the desire to see defendants like George 
Zimmerman forced to "pay" for the harms that they needlessly and 
culpably inflict on others. While this point may seem obvious, it 
isn't. Most people repudiate revenge and therefore the notion that it 
plays any role in the criminal justice system. 
Second, this attitude toward revenge is misguided and needs to 
change. We need to recognize that vengeance not only does but 
should play a significant role in motivating criminal punishment. 
Our vengeful reactions to harmful crimes are not ugly or shameful,· 
on the contrary, they manifest a deep valuation of victims and a 
bitter denunciation of individuals who actively renounce this 
valuation through their criminal behavior. 
Third, these two points have significant implications for the two 
main theories of criminal punishment: ''retributivism," which says 
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that criminals should be punished in order to give them their "just 
deserts," and "consequentialism," which says that criminals should 
be punished in order to bring about such good consequences as 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Traditionally, these 
two theories have been at war with one another. But I will show how 
recognizing revenge as a motivation and justification for 
punishment can help to end this war and bring these two theories 
together. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 22, 2002, Ariel Castro kidnapped Michelle Knight.1 
1. Erin Donaghue, Michelle Knight, Cleveland Kidnapping Victim, to Ariel 
Castro: "Your Hell Is Just Beginning", CBSNEWS (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michelle-knight-cleveland-kidnapping-victim -to-ariel -
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For eleven years, he imprisoned Michelle at his house, tortured her, 
raped her, impregnated her several times, and brutally forced her to 
miscarry.2 
On May 6, 2013, Michelle and her two fellow victims, Georgina 
"Gina" DeJesus and Amanda Berry, finally managed to escape.a 
On July 26, 2013, Castro pled guilty to 937 counts of rape, 
kidnapping, and aggravated murder in order to avoid the death 
penalty.4 
On August 1, 2013, just before Judge Michael Russo sentenced 
Castro to life in prison without parole plus one thousand years, the 
three victims were permitted to give victim-impact statements.5 Here 
is what Michelle Knight said (in part): 
You took 11 years from my life, but I've got my life back! I spent 11 
years in hell. Now your hell is just beginning. I will overcome all 
that happened, but you're going to face hell for eternity! From this 
moment on, I am NOT going to let you define me or affect who I 
am. I will live on but you will die a little more inside each day as 
you think of those 11 years and the atrocities you inflicted on us. 
What does God think of you hypocritically going to church each 
Sunday and then coming home to torture us? The death penalty 
would be the easy way out; you don't deserve that! We want you to 
spend the rest of your life in prison!6 
Vengeful words indeed. To see just how vengeful they are, 
imagine that the governor of a northeastern state who had 
presidential ambitions emailed the following similar statements to a 
defiant mayor: 
Now your hell is just beginning. I will overcome your slight, but 
you're going to face hell for eternity! From this moment on, I am 
NOT going to let you win. I will live on but you will die a little 
more inside each day as you think of your insolence. 
Imagine also that the mayor then leaked this email to the media. 
What would happen to the governor? Almost everybody would 
roundly condemn him, and his political life-certainly his 
castro-your-hell-is-just-beginning/. 
2. See id. 
3. Michael Muskal, Ariel Castro Gets Life, No Parole; Victim Says His Hell 
Awaits, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la · na · nn-ariel · 
castro-michelle-knight-20130801,0,284427 4.story#axzz2r2LCAkQc ((last updated Aug. 
1, 2013, 10:50 AM). 
4. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ariel Castro Pleads Guilty to 937 Counts in Ohio 
Kidnapping Case, DALLAS NEWS (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20130726-ariel -castro-pleads-guilty-
to-937 -counts-in-ohio-kidnapping-case.ece. 
5. See Donaghue, supra note 1. 
6. Statements on Behalf of Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus and Michelle Knight, PR 
NEWSWIRE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/statements-on-
behalf-of-amanda -berry -gina -dejesus-and -michelle-knight-217977801.html. 
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presidential ambitions-would die a swift death. This kind of 
vengeful language is simply unacceptable from a governor. 
But if it is unacceptable from a governor, shouldn't it be 
unacceptable from any individual? Shouldn't we equally condemn 
Michelle Knight? After all, Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for 
sixteen more years than Michelle and never said anything nearly as 
vengeful about his racist captors.7 Why couldn't Michelle Knight 
have risen to the same heights as Mandela? Shouldn't we denounce 
her for saying such hateful things to her captor?s 
7. See Barbara Mutch, Mandela Taught the Power of Forgiveness: Column, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 8, 2013, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/08/nelson-mandela-remember· 
column/3896245/; Justice Malala, 'Mandela Looked His Enemy in the Eye and Held 
Him Close', TELEGRAPH (Dec. 7, 2013 12:54 PM), 
http://www,telegraph.co. uk/news/worldnews/nelson-mandela/10501060/Mandela· 
looked-his-enemy-in-the-eye-and-held-him-close.html. 
8. Opponents of victim-impact statements offer two main arguments. First, they 
argue that victim-impact statements debase the criminal justice system by permitting, 
if not encouraging, victims and their families not to forgive but to do the very 
opposite-express their ugliest, most vengeful sentiments. Indeed, for this reason, 
victim-impact statements have been derogatorily characterized as "institutionalized 
revenge." See Catherine Guastello, Comment, Victim Impact Statements: 
Institutionalized Revenge, 37 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1321 (2005); see also Michael Price, Revenge 
and the People Who Seek It: New Research Offers Insight into the Dish Best Served 
Cold, AM. PSYCHOL. Assoc., http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/revenge.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2014) ("Victim impact statements ... can partially satisfy a victim's 
vengeful feelings while also putting the responsibility for punishment on the state ... 
. ");Brian Rosebury, Private Revenge and its Relation to Punishment, 21UTILITAS1, 11 
(2009) ("[A] suspicion of [revenge's) presence hangs over some recent developments in 
criminal justice doctrines. One example is the introduction of 'victim impact 
statements' in some jurisdictions."). Second, opponents of victim-impact statements 
argue that they are unfair to defendants. While these statements bear no relevance to 
defendants' blameworthiness, they play on judges' and juries' emotions and thereby 
manipulate them into increasing defendants' sentences. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 860-61 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A)spects of the character of the 
victim unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of his crime are irrelevant the 
defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral guilt' and therefore cannot justify a 
death sentence.") (citations omitted); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact 
Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 421-22 (2003) 
("[C]ommentators are particularly concerned that victim impact statements highlight 
the perceived relative worth of the victim, and consequently that the jury's judgment 
about whether to impose the death sentence will be influenced by this inappropriate 
factor .... [T)he death reflects neither the murderer's mental state nor the morality of 
the act itself. In addition, victim impact statements detail the various harms that 
befall the victim or the victim's family after a crime ... that a defendant might not 
have been able to foresee at the time of the crime.") (citations omitted). This criticism 
of victim-impact statements is part of a more general debate about whether the harm 
a person causes should be factored into her blame or punishment because it was a 
matter of "outcome luck"-something outside her control and therefore something that 
arguably should not affect her desert. For two opposing views, see Bebhinn Donnelly, 
Sentencing and Consequences: A Divergence Between Blameworthiness and Liability to 
Punishment, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 392 (2007); and Ken Levy, The Solution to the 
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Only a very small number of people might answer this last 
question in the affirmative. Most would insist that Michelle was 
perfectly justified in saying and thinking what she did, that she had 
every right to wish eternal suffering on the man who had cruelly and 
callously inflicted such suffering on her for his own pleasure. So 
counterbalancing our tendency to condemn vengeance in the abstract 
is our tendency to adopt the very opposite position when we learn of 
the particular circumstances that justify it.9 The task of this paper is 
to show that harmful criminal wrongdoing is just such a 
circumstance and therefore that, contrary to popular wisdom, 
vengeance plays a legitimate and central role in the criminal justice 
system.10 
The theory of retributivism is sometimes thought to capture this 
point of view. But this perception is not quite right. The relationship 
between retributivism and revenge is much more complicated, as I 
hope to show. Retributivism is the theory that we punish criminals 
in order to give them what they deserve because this result is 
inherently good-an end that is justified in itself.11 Retributivism is 
usually contrasted with consequentialism, which suggests that we 
Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful Action 
That Causes It, 24 LAW & PHIL. 263 (2005). 
9. Cf. Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason the Behavioral 
Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 539 passim (2010) 
(arguing that particular details about an individual's psychology and past victimhood 
tend to motivate sympathy more effectively than abstract theories about determinism 
and responsibility). 
10. See Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The 
True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031, 1049 (2003) ("The centrality 
of revenge is ... so widespread and pervasive in the criminal justice system that it 
could be considered one of its central tenets .... By not accounting for this desire in 
their vision of a future criminal justice system, current legal scholars underestimate 
its role in current punishment.") (citation omitted). 
11. See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 87 (2008); MICHAEL MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 87-88, 111 (1997); David 
Dolinko, Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
403, 406 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011); R. A. Duff & D. Garland, 
Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT l, 7 (R. A. 
Duff & David Garland eds., 1994); JOHN RAWLS, Two Concepts of Rules, in COLLECTED 
PAPERS 20, 21-22 (Samuel Freedman ed., 1999). Some opponents of retributivism 
include: Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2002) [hereinafter Christopher, Deterring 
Retributivism]; Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and 
Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (2003) [hereinafter Christopher, The 
Prosecutor's Dilemma]; Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 
269 (2005) [hereinafter Christopher, Time and Punishment]; Edward Rubin, Just Say 
No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17 (2003); Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure 
of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD. 289 (1996); Brian Slattery, Commentary, The Myth of 
Retributive Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 27 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); 
Mark Thornton, Against Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra, at 
83; James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003). 
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punish criminals in order to bring about a particular good result 
beyond-or instead of-merely giving criminals their just deserts: 
protecting society against more crimes by (a) incapacitating them 
(through incarceration or, in rare cases, death); (b) discouraging 
them from repeating the same kinds of crimes after release (specific 
deterrence and possibly rehabilitation); and (c) discouraging others in 
society from committing similar crimes (general deterrence).12 
There is also a third theory-expressivism-which suggests that 
we punish criminals in order to express our moral disapproval of 
their criminal behavior.1a Punishment is the best, if not the only, 
"language" through which we may blame individuals for violating the 
criminal law, communicate the gravity of their wrongdoing, and 
thereby affirm the moral and criminal-legal norms of the 
community.14 It may plausibly be argued that expressivism 
ultimately reduces to a combination of the two main theories in 
play-retributivism (giving criminals their just deserts) and 
consequentialism (for educative effect).15 But whether or not this 
reductive hypothesis is true, the virtue of expressivism is that it 
captures moral censure and stigmatization, two essential components 
12. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414-20 (1978); MOORE, 
supra note 11, at 91-92; Dolinko, supra note 11, at 405-06; Duff & Garland, supra note 
11, at 8. For critiques of both retributivism and consequentialism, see BOONIN, supra 
note 11, at 37-154. 
13. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 180-92. 
14. See id. at 183; R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 16-
19 (2001); DOUGI..AS HUSAK, 0VERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
93-94 (2008); MOORE, supra note 11, at 84-88; Ai.'IDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: 
THE CHOICE OF PuNISHMENTS 48-49 (1976); Duff & Garland, supra note 11, at 8; Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in A READER ON PuNISHMENT, 
supra note 11, at 73, 74; Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 
13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 (1984); Robert F. Schopp, Mental Illness, Police Power 
Interventions, and the Expressive Functions of Punishment, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 99, 109-13 (2013); Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and 
Proportionality, in A READER ON PuNISHMENT, supra note 11, at 115-27. For critiques 
of expressivism, see HUSAK, supra, at 88; Dolinko, supra note 11, at 417-20; D.B. 
Hershenov, Restitution and Revenge, 96 J. PHIL. 79, 85-86 (1999). For a very helpful 
summary of consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism and potential problems 
with each, see DUFF, supra, at 3-34. For a list of purposes that do not fall cleanly into 
any one of these three categories (retributivism, consequentialism, or expressivism), 
see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 80-81 (Walter Kaufmann ed., 
R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1967). 
15. See Dolinko, supra note 11, at 421; Hampton, supra note 14, at 212-13; Jean 
Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, 
supra note 11, at 1, 13, 14; Eric Jaffe, The Complicated Psychology of Revenge, 
OBSERVER, Oct. 2011, 
available at 
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index. php/publications/observer/2011/october-
11/the-complica ted-psychology-of-revenge.html; J.L. Mackie, Morality and the 
Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4-5 (1982). 
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of criminal punishment.16 
Regarding the first of these three theories of punishment and the 
central topic of this Article, retributivism, I will argue that it is only 
partly correct. While retributivism helps both to explain and to 
justify criminal punishment, it cannot completely fulfill both of these 
tasks-explanation and justification--on its own. Instead, it must be 
supplemented by what is usually considered to be its principal 
competitor11-again, consequentialism. In this way, my paper is 
ultimately a plea for rapprochement. The war between retributivism 
and consequentialism has gone on long enough. This Article will 
attempt to hammer out the terms of a lasting peace treaty.1s 
The war between consequentialism and retributivism has been 
fueled by three kinds of mischievous thought-experiments, 
hypotheticals in which highly unusual conditions are stipulated in 
such a way that the two theories' different goals (backward-looking 
just deserts and forward-looking good consequences) end up oppos~ng 
each other: (a) bad consequences result from punishing criminals,rn 
16. See HUSAK, supra note 14, at 93; Douglas Husak, The De Minimis "Defence" to 
Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 328, 349-50 
(R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011). 
17. See generally DUFF, supra note 14, at 3; Christopher, Deterring Retributiuism. 
supra note 11, at 855-65; Dolinko, supra note 11, at 408-09. 
18. Many courts and scholars have advocated "mixed" or "hybrid" theories of 
punishment. See, e.g., Tapia v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387-88 (2011); FLETCHER, supra 
note 12, at 418; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 21 (2d ed. Harvard Univ. Press 2008); HUSAK, supra note 14, at 
203-05; MOORE, supra note 11, at 92-94; VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 49-55; Gerard 
V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
19, 30-31 (2003); Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving? 26 Nous 447, 452 
(1992) [hereinafter Husak, VVhy Punish]; Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal 
Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 970-77 (2000) [hereinafter Husak, Retribution]; 
Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2004); Alice Ristroph, 
Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1297-
98 (2006). But see DUFF, supra note 14, at xvii-xviii; MOORE, supra note 11, at 94, 97-
102 (arguing that mixed theories fail because retributivism does all the work and 
consequentialism either interferes with this work or gratuitously free-rides on it); 
Christopher, Deterring Retributiuism, supra note 11, at 869 ("The difficulty for most 
mixed theories is that either substantive issues of justification are assumed away by 
definition or the instability of the components leads to a collapse back into 
consequentialism. While [H.L.A.] Hart's mixed theory may avoid those problems, its 
own difficulty is in setting the amount of punishment.") (footnotes omitted); Donald A. 
Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of 
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1390-91 (2003) ("The comforting consistency of 
utilitarian and retributive theories with respect to most practical issues may be a 
cognitive illusion."). For a survey and critique of different mixed theories, see Dolinko, 
supra note 11, at 421-27. 
19. Punishment "abolitionists"-people who believe that criminal punishment does 
(much) more harm than good-rely on these kinds of examples. Abolitionists include: 
BOONIN, supra note 11, at 213-75; H. Bianchi, Abolition: Assensus and Sanctuary, in A 
READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 11, at 336, 336-39; Eugene E. Dais, Commentary: 
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(b) good consequences result from punishing innocent individuals,20 
and (c) good consequences result from not punishing criminals.21 The 
idea behind all three thought-experiments is to show that 
consequentialism (good consequences) and retributivism (just 
deserts) can come into conflict and therefore that we must choose one 
over the other. It is certainly true that these three kinds of situations 
can drive a wedge between retributivism and consequentialism. As 
long as two different ethical theories of any kind have two different 
primary goals, there will always be ways to bring these goals-and 
therefore these theories-into conflict. But the fact that retributivism 
and consequentialism can come into conflict hardly shows that they 
do not usually work together. On the contrary, that is exactly what 
retributivism and consequentialism do-usually work together. 
In fact, retributivism not only works well with consequentialism; 
it needs consequentialism. There are three reasons. In Part III, I will 
provide the first two of these reasons. Both of these reasons start 
Positive Retributivism and Despicable Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, 
supra note 11, at 107; see also Husak, VVhy Punish, supra note 18, at 448-49 (arguing 
that, in several different kinds of situations, an offender should not be punished even 
though he deserves it because the consequences of punishing him would be too costly); 
Husak, Retribution, supra note 18, at 975-76 ("Retributivists ... seemingly suppose 
that their task is complete when they show that the punishment of culpable 
wrongdoers is intrinsically good .... But this demonstration does not suffice to justify 
the institution of punishment-even for retributivists. They must show not only that 
giving culpable wrongdoers what they deserve is intrinsically valuable, but also that it 
is sufficiently valuable to offset the drawbacks that inevitably result when an 
institution of punishment is created. . . . My point is that the value of realizing 
retributive justice, by itself, is insufficient to justify the creation of an institution of 
punishment with [several] formidable drawbacks .... ") (citations omitted). 
20. See J.J.C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in 
UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 69-72 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 
1973); RAWLS, supra note 11, at 9-13; MOORE, supra note 11, at 93 n.19, 94-97; 
WILFRID J. WALUCHOW, THE DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICAL 
THEORY 166-68 (2003); Hampton, supra note 14, at 214; Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. 
Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 
118 (2000); Christopher, Deterring Retributivism, supra note 11, at 870-80, 922-23. 
21. See 2 JEREMY BENTHA.i\1, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 193 
(1988); see generally MOORE, supra note 11, at 100-01 (proposing a hypothetical in 
which "[o]ur pretending to punish [a rapist who has accidentally lost the ability to 
engage in sexual activity] will ... serve the needs of general deterrence and maintain 
social cohesion, and the cost to the state will be less than if it actually did punish 
him."): Christopher, Deterring Retributivism, supra note 11, at 858 n.66 ("[P]ublicity of 
the faked punishment will have a deterrent effect. . . . [I]t is the perception of 
punishment, and not actual punishment, which generates general deterrence. 
Retributivists conclude, therefore, that the general deterrence theory of punishment 
fails to justify actual punishment but only the faking of punishment.''); Dolinko, supra 
note 11, at 406-07 (arguing that consequentialists are committed to accepting both (a) 
hypothetical "sham punishments"-that is, "method[s] of deceiving both offenders and 
the general public into believing that offenders are punished, even though they receive 
no punishment at all"; and (b) hypothetical "nonpunitive" techniques that offer more 
favorable cost/benefit ratios than criminal punishment). 
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from the fact that retributivism is as much in need of explanation as 
the thing that it is trying to explain (criminal punishment). The 
notion that the state should give criminals the punishment that they 
deserve requires further explanation because retributivists do not 
also believe that the state should give good people the praise or 
rewards that they deserve for their virtuous acts. So why do 
retributivists think that it is imperative that the state inflict negative 
desert but not bestow positive desert? Simply stating, as 
retributivism does, that we should give people their just deserts does 
not answer this question. The concept of just deserts is neutral 
between negative and positive desert and therefore fails to explain 
retributivism's asymmetrical emphasis on negative desert. 
The first consequentialist reason why retributivists believe that 
the state should inflict negative desert rather than guarantee 
positive desert is that inflicting negative desert is much more 
practicable than guaranteeing positive desert.22 Difficult as the task 
of law enforcement may be, it is much easier to find, arrest, 
prosecute, convict, and punish criminals than it would be for the 
state to seek out the much larger number of virtuous people and give 
them the praise and rewards that they deserve. 
The second consequentialist reason why retributivists believe 
that the state should inflict negative desert rather than guarantee 
positive desert is what I will refer to as the Motivation Thesis. The 
Motivation Thesis says that, whether or not retributivists admit it (to 
themselves, no less to others), retributivism is largely motivated by 
vengeance; that retributivists' desire for retributive justice, for giving 
criminals their just deserts, is itself motivated by the (deeper) desire 
to give criminals a taste of their own medicine, to pay them back for 
the unjustified and unexcused harm that they have caused.23 And, as 
a motivation, vengeance (or the channeling of vengeful feelings, 
which is sometimes euphemized as "victim closure") is 
consequentialist, not retributivist, because we act on it in order to 
achieve a good consequence-namely, annulling the crime (or turning 
the crime back on the criminal) and thereby achieving a restoration 
of the moral and social order, which itself contributes to the victim's 
sense that the criminal's wrongdoing has been at least partly 
righted.24 
22. See HUSAK, supra note 14, at 205-06. 
23. See Jeffrie Murphy, Hatred: A Qualified Defense, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 
88, 95 (Jules Coleman ed., 1988); Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Revenge, 25 LAW & 
PHIL. 81, 115 (2006). 
24. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (stating that "[s]ociety is 
entitled to impose severe sanctions on a[n] ... offender to express its condemnation of 
the crime and to seek restoration of the moral imbalance caused by the offense"); 
CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 10 (1999); 
GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 37-38 (1998)] ("Punishment 
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Most retributivists are reluctant to admit that retributive justice 
is motivated by vengeance largely because they fail to realize that 
vengeance can be not only justified but justificatory.25 And they fail 
to achieve this realization because vengeance has a bad reputation.2s 
It is generally thought to be just plain wrong, a feeling that should 
not be indulged but rather repudiated in favor of its angelical 
opposite-forgiveness.21 So to suggest that vengeance can actually be 
justified or justify criminal punishment will strike many as not only 
misguided but also wicked and pathologicaI.2s Still, this perception is 
wrong. We retributivists need to do better damage control. We should 
no longer be reluctant to articulate our theory of criminal 
punishment in terms of vengeance. In Part IV, then, I will 
supplement the Motivation Thesis with what I call the Justification 
Thesis. The Justification Thesis says that the desire to exact revenge 
against criminals for the harm that they cause is not an unfortunate, 
irrational disposition lodged deep in our psyches but rather a morally 
appropriate reaction-indeed, a perfectly decent and honorable 
motivation for criminal punishment.29 
counteracts domination by reducing the criminal to the position of the victim. When 
the criminal suffers as the victim suffered, equality between the two is 
reestablished."); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, 
supra note 23, at 111, 125, 130; Murphy, supra note 23, at 89; Theodore M. Benditt, 
Revenge, 38 THE PHIL. F. 357, 358, 362 (2007); Bradley, supra note 18, at 29-30; Alan 
Brudner, In Defence of Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 
11, at 93 passim; Dolinko, supra note 11, at 416-17; John Finnis, Retribution: 
Punishment's Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 103 (1999); George Fletcher, What Is 
Punishment Imposed For? 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101, 104, 109 (1994); 
Hershenov, supra note 14, at 80, 87-88; Jones, supra note 10, at 1048-49; Mackie, 
supra note 15, at 5 (attributing this position to Hegel and Kant); Markel, supra note 
18, at 1446-47. 
25. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 152; Rosebury, supra note 8, at 11. 
26. See BARTON, supra note 24, at xiv, 1-2, 9; PETER A FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF 
VENGEANCE x (2001); Murphy, supra note 23, at 90; Rosebury, supra note 8, at 20. But 
see ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 339 (1994) (suggesting that the "impulse of 
retribution" is surrounded by an "aura of reverence" and is imbued with "the ethereal 
sense that [it] embodies some higher ethical truth"). 
27. See BARTON, supra note 24, at 2; MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND 
REVENGE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORGIVENESS INSTINCT xix (2008); Jeffrie Murphy, 
Introduction, The Retributive Emotions, in FORGIVENESS AI'1D MERCY, supra note 23, at 
1, 4; David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then 
Why Is It So Hard to Find? 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1663-64, 1666-67 (2000). 
28. See BARTON, supra note 24, at xiv. 
29. Since the late 1980s and especially in the last fifteen years, some scholars are 
finally admitting this point. See BARTON, supra note 24, at xv, 30; MOORE, supra note 
11, at 117-18, 141-44; Murphy, supra note 23, at 90; STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER 
ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 532 (2011); WRIGHT, supra 
note 26, at 339; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 90. Even the United States Supreme 
Court accepts this point. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028; Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 (2007) ("[A] punitive damages award, instead of serving a 
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Finally, in Part VI, I will present the last of the three reasons 
why retributivism needs consequentialism: consequentialism does a 
much better job of explaining and justifying criminal punishment of 
harmless or victimless crimes--crimes that do not necessarily harm 
anybody (e.g., drug possession, resisting arrest, and perjury)-than 
does retributivism.3o While it is true that retributivists believe that 
people who commit crimes, harmful or harmless, should be punished, 
the primary explanation and justification of the infliction of criminal 
punishment for harmless crimes is consequentialism. Retributivism 
plays a much smaller role. 
II. THE MAIN GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The three primary goals of the criminal justice system are to give 
criminals the punishment that they deserve,31 minimize crime,32 and 
thereby express serious moral condemnation of criminals for their 
criminal acts.33 Putting aside the third goal for now, there is no need 
to decide which of the first two goals is more important. It is perfectly 
acceptable to maintain that they are both equally important, at least 
when it comes to punishing harmful, as opposed to harmless, crimes. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, one of the central points of this 
Article is to end the unnecessary war between these two positions 
and recognize that they generally work beautifully together. 
A. The First Primary Goal of the Criminal Justice System: Crime 
Minimization 
Regarding the first goal, why do we want to minimize crime in 
the first place? In a previous paper, I offered this answer: 
The criminal law is largely concerned with protecting people 
compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and 
deterrence that underlie every criminal sanction."). 
30. As I will briefly argue in Part VI, the classic inchoate crimes-attempt, 
conspiracy, and solicitation-often inflict psychological harm even when they do not 
inflict physical harm. In support of this point, see R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 130 
(1996); Anthony M. Dillof, Modal Retributiuism: A Theory of Sanctions for Attempts 
and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 662 (2011); Susan Hanley 
Duncan, My space Is Also Their Space: Ideas for Keeping Children Sa{ e From Sexual 
Predators on Social-Networking Sites, 96 KY. L.J. 527, 542 (2007-08); Hershenov, 
supra note 14, at 87. 
31. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Many criminal scholars suggest that 
the primary purpose of the criminal justice system is crime prevention. See, e.g., LARRY 
ALEXA.~DER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN (WITH STEPHEN MORSE), CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2009); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, 
PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 30-31 (2006). But prevention, which 
connotes success, is less accurate a term than deterrence or minimization for the 
simple reason that, in spite of the existence of a criminal justice system, crime still 
occurs. 
33. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
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against deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely valued 
interests, to the interests that they generally most highly value--
namely life, physical well-being, emotional well-being, family, 
liberty, and property. That is why we have criminal laws against 
homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery, kidnapping, 
unlawful imprisonment, and theft.34 
I should also have included general security, which is protected by 
criminalizing espionage, treason, and terrorism. 
Of course, there are other criminal offenses that do not 
necessarily harm the supremely valued interests listed above-for 
example, reckless endangerment, solicitation, conspiracy, and 
attempt. But what justifies legislatures in defining these acts as 
crimes is the same kind of goal: protecting our supremely valued 
interests against acts that not only do damage to our supremely 
valued interests but also tend or threaten to damage one or more of 
our supremely valued interests.35 For the same reason, public order 
should not be included in the list of supremely valued interests. 
Instead, it should be included in another list, the list of lesser or 
secondarily valued interests. Its inferior status explains why such 
victimless crimes as disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and public 
drunkenness are misdemeanors rather than felonies. 
So minimizing injury to our supremely or secondarily valued 
interests is one of the two primary goals of the criminal justice 
system. We established such a system (way back when) and maintain 
it largely to discourage as many people as possible from committing 
crimes.36 But how exactly do we go about doing this discouraging 
and minimizing? The first thing we do is threaten the public with 
criminal punishment. The (just) state tells the public what kinds of 
acts are legally forbidden and what level of criminal punishment they 
may expect to suffer if they still perform any of these forbidden acts 
and are caught. It defines what it considers to be supreme-value-
threatening acts and supreme-value-damaging acts as criminal 
offenses and threatens criminal punishment for their performance. It 
does all of this defining and threatening with the goal of deterring as 
34. Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link 
Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1065 (2007) 
(emphasis omitted). When protected by the State, these supremely valued interests are 
called rights. 
35. See DUFF, supra note 30, at 134-35; HART, supra note 18, at 6; see also Bradley, 
supra note 18, at 25-26 (offering a slightly different account). Because some crimes are 
harmless and do not tend to cause harm-for example, drug possession, resisting 
arrest, and perjury-their criminalization warrants a different justification. These 
kinds of crimes will be addressed more fully below in Part VI. 
36. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 
211 (2013) ("[T]he argument is that the absence of punishment mechanisms in a 
society would lead to a set of violations sufficient to threaten the existence of the 
society."); Husak, Why Punish, supra note 18, at 459-62. 
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many people as possible from performing these supreme-value-
hostile acts and thereby minimizing human-caused threats to 
individuals' enjoyment of their supremely valued interests.37 
Unfortunately, however, no criminal justice system can fully 
eliminate crime.38 In every society, some individuals will simply not 
be deterred by the threat of punishment. What, then, should the 
State do with these individuals, at least those who are caught? The 
answer-and the second means of fulfilling the goal of crime 
minimization (in addition to making threats to punish)-is the 
State's execution of its earlier threats to punish these law-breakers. 
The State's actual punishment of criminals helps to minimize crime 
in three different ways: by (a) incapacitation (temporarily or 
permanently preventing such criminals from committing further 
crimes); (b) specific deterrence (discouraging these specific 
individuals from committing further crimes and thereby risking 
further punishment); and (c) general deterrence (discouraging many 
other would-be criminals from committing crimes by showing, 
through the example of these particular criminals, what will likely 
happen to them if they are caught).39 
B. The Second Primary Goal of the Criminal Justice System: 
Retribution 
Is consequentialism correct that criminal punishment's 
contributions toward crime minimization are sufficient to justify 
criminal punishment? The answer might seem to be an obvious yes 
until we really consider just what criminal punishment is: the 
intentional infliction of hardship, deprivation, or suffering by the 
state in return for a proven violation of its criminal laws.4o 
Hardship, deprivation, or suffering is not merely a foreseeable but 
37. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 38; Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility 
and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 90 (2005); John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith, 
and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 Lt\W & Soc'Y 
REV. 165, 165-66 (2001); Hampton, supra note 14, at 210-11; von Hirsch, supra note 
14, at 122. 
38. See Stephen Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 267 
(1999). 
39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
40. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 7, 17; DUFF, supra note 14, at xiv-xv; HART, 
supra note 18, at 4-5; HUSAK, supra note 14, at 92; David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of 
Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1626 (1992); Feinberg, supra note 14, at 73; 
Husak, Why Punish, supra note 18, at 455; Husak, Retribution, supra note 18, at 963-
64; Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive 
Detention, 27 L. & PHIL. 383, 408 (2008); von Hirsch, supra note 14, at 118; Zaibert, 
supra note 23, at 110; see also Hampton, supra note 24, at 126 ("I propose that the 
most general and accurate definition of 'punishment' is: the experience of defeat at the 
hands of the victim (either directly or indirectly through a legal authority)."); Dolinko, 
supra note 11, at 404-05 (critiquing Hart's definition). 
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unintended consequence, as it is with (a) civil commitment,41 (b) 
administrative regulations,42 and (c) medical treatment.43 Once 
again, hardship, deprivation, or suffering is intended.44 
The same, however, cannot be said of tort remedies. For this 
reason, they are harder to distinguish from criminal punishment 
than are civil commitment, administrative regulations, and medical 
treatment.45 Like criminal punishment, tort remedies such as 
compensatory damages and restitution are intended to make 
defendants suffer a deprivation-namely, a deprivation of their 
money. But there are still two main differences between tort 
remedies and punishment. First, tort remedies are designed to fulfill 
two main ends: (i) deterring defendants and the general public from 
committing the same kinds of torts in the future and (ii) restoring as 
much as possible the plaintiffs, whom the defendants previously 
injured, to the condition that they enjoyed prior to injury.46 While 
criminal punishment also aims largely at deterrence, it does not 
generally aim at victim restoration.47 Instead, it intentionally inflicts 
41. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-64, 368-69 (1997); Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 535-539 (1979); FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 412-13; HART, supra note 
18, at 17; HUSAK, supra note 14, at 93. 
42. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-106 (2003); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963); George L. Blum, Annotation, State Statutes or 
Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with 
Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders-Duty to Register, Requirements for 
Registration, and Procedural Matters, 38 A.L.R.6TH 1, § 31 (registration requirement 
as nonpunitive) (2013); see also Romualdo P. Eclavea and Lucas D. Martin, Sex 
Offender Registration Statutes, 53 AM. JUR. 2D MENTALLY IMPAIRED PERSONS § 126 
(2013) (discussing sex-offender registration laws). 
43. See State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 751-53 (La. 1992); People v. Fuller, 248 
N.E.2d 17, 20-21 (N.Y. 1969); Jami Floyd, The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs 
to Prisoners: State of the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1272-78 (1990); 
Edward M. Opton, Jr., Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy Is 
Punishment, 45 MISS. L.J. 605, 608 (1974). 
44. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 12-17; HUSAK, supra note 14, at 92. 
45. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 783-84 (1997); Aman Ahluwalia, 
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 489, 491-92, 503-05 (2006). 
46. See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 355 (2007); Steiker, supra note 45, at 784-85. 
47. Some scholars, however, advocate shifting the criminal justice system's focus 
from retributive to restorative justice. See, e.g., BOONIN, supra note 11, at 213-75; 
Bianchi, supra note 19, at 340; Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, An International 'Truth 
Commission": Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution, 36 V AND. 
J. TRAi'ISNAT'L L. 209 passim (2003); Lerman, supra note 27, at 1664, 1674-75; see also 
ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 209-15 (arguing that restorative justice might 
supplement but cannot entirely replace criminal punishment, especially for more 
serious crimes); Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 16, 29-30 
(Austin Sarat, and Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) explicating and briefly critiquing the 
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hardship, deprivation, or suffering in order to achieve two other ends 
(in addition to deterrence): giving the criminal what she deserves 
and expressing condemnation of the criminal for her criminal 
activity.48 
Second, while criminal punishment may amount to a fine, which 
superficially resembles monetary damages and restitution, criminal 
punishment is often implemented in other ways that tort remedies 
are not. These other ways include incarceration, probation, 
shaming,49 community service,5o license revocations,51 and loss of 
civil rights such as the right to vote52 and the right to own firearms.53 
1. The Problem of Punishment 
Given that the criminal justice system intentionally inflicts 
hardship, deprivation, or suffering, one might very well argue that 
criminal punishment simply cannot be just-no matter how much it 
helps to minimize crime. On this view, no matter what the person's 
crime, punishment is the morally wrongful response. This is what 
David Boonin calls the problem of punishment.54 
view that the criminal justice system should strive for restorative justice rather than 
for retributive justice). Charles Barton advocates a restorative approach that includes 
revenge. See BARTON, supra note 24, at 137. 
48. See supra notes 11 and 13 and accompanying text. 
49. See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733, 734-37 (1998) (providing several examples of shaming punishments). 
50. See generally WARREN YOUNG, COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS 3-70 (1979) 
(summarizing the background, legislation, philosophy, and practice of community 
service sentences). 
51. See Janis Mary Gomez, Comment, The Potential Double Implications of 
Administrative License Revocation, 46 EMORY L.J. 329, 329 (1997) (noting that the 
majority of "states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws which provide for 
the administrative revocation of a driver's license after a first arrest for drunk 
driving." (citation omitted)). 
52. See Mark E. Thompson, Don't Do the Crime If You Ever Intend to Vote Again: 
Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 168 (2002) (noting that despite an "expansionist view of 
the franchise" over the last 150 years, 1.4 million ex-felons "remain permanently 
excluded from the electoral process in nine states.") (footnote omitted). 
53. See 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any [ex-felon] ... to ship 
or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, 
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."). 
54. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 1; see also DUFF, supra note 14, at xi-xii (''To 
ask, 'What can justify criminal punishment?'-the central question in philosophical 
discussions of punishment - is to ask what can justify practices of this kind .... The 
question of justification ... is ... a crisis of legitimacy: for when we reflect on the 
punishments inflicted (in our name) on so many of our fellow citizens and on the 
effects of those punishments on those who suffer them, we cannot but raise the 
question of legitimacy-of what can justify any practice of criminal punishment."); 
HUSAK, supra note 14, at 92 ("I argue that state punishment is hard to justify because 
it involves two essential features: hard treatment and censure. Under normal 
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In response to the problem of punishment, one might continue to 
stress the benefits, if not necessity, of crime minimization. But the 
punishment abolitionist will maintain that no matter how great the 
social utility of an institution, it cannot be morally legitimate if it is 
fundamentally inhumane. (Consider, for example, slavery.) And an 
institution such as the criminal justice system that intentionally 
inflicts suffering for the sake of suffering is fundamentally 
inhumane.55 
So in order to refute the punishment abolitionist, it needs to be 
shown that the criminal justice system-in particular, the practice of 
criminal punishment-is not inherently inhumane. According to 
retributivists, if social utility will not help to demonstrate this point, 
something else will: moral desert. What justifies criminal 
punishment-intentionally inflicting suffering on criminals-is not 
merely its significant contribution to crime minimization but also the 
fact that it is what criminals deserve in virtue of their criminal 
wrongdoing.56 
According to retributivists, then, the state is justified in 
circumstances, impositions of hard treatment and censure violate important personal 
interests. Because ordinary utilitarian reasons do not allow the government to infringe 
these important interests, we have reason to countenance a right not to be punished .. 
. . [T]he key to a theory of criminalization is to determine when the state is permitted 
to infringe the right not to be punished."); id. at 95 ("The criminal sanction is the most 
powerful weapon in the state arsenal; the government can do nothing worse to its 
citizens than to punish them .... As a type of response ... criminal sanctions are the 
most severe and therefore the most in need of justification."); Christopher, Deterring 
Retributivism, supra note 11, at 852 ("[P]unishment does require justification, for the 
same reason we consider conduct violating the core prohibitions of our criminal law to 
be wrong. Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain, suffering, and 
deprivation, which is prima facie wrong.") (citations omitted); Dolinko, supra note 40, 
at 1626 ("Punishment involves the deliberate imposition of suffering on persons 
convicted of crime; it involves treating these persons in ways we ordinarily believe 
violate human rights (for example, incarceration and execution). Why is it morally 
permissible to do these things (or at least some of them) to criminals, when in most 
other contexts such treatment is morally prohibited?"). 
55. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. Doug Husak argues that the 
task of justifying criminal punishment is to show not that it is morally permissible or 
that it is morally obligatory but that it helps "the state more closely approximateO the 
ideal of justice, and thus addO value to the world." Husak, Why Punish, supra note 18, 
at 454; see also HUSAK, supra note 14, at 200-01 ("I share [Michael] Moore's judgment 
that the state of affairs in which [people who commit monstrous crimes] receive their 
just deserts is preferable to the state of affairs in which they do not (even though the 
former may not be intrinsically good). I also concur with Moore about the crucial point 
that divides retributivists from consequentialists: our judgments about these 
respective states of affairs do not depend on utilitarian gains."); see also Husak, 
Retribution, supra note 18, at 984-85 ("The only benefit of punishing harmless 
wrongdoing is that so doing makes 'the world ... a morally better place.' But there are 
many ways to improve the world; exacting retributive justice on harmless wrongdoers 
is very low on any sensible list of priorities.") (citations omitted). 
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inflicting criminal punishment not because of its presumed good 
consequences for society, as consequentialists claim, and not because 
of its symbolic importance, as expressivists claim, but simply because 
criminals deserve it.57 This desert can take two forms: either a "moral 
debt" that only criminal punishment can discharge58 or a right to 
criminal punishment that the criminal "earned" through her 
commission of a crime.59 Both the debt view and the rights view of 
criminal punishment presuppose that the criminal is at least 
criminally, if not morally, responsible for her crime.60 
2. Proportionality 
There are two kinds of retributivism: weak and strong.61 Weak 
retributivism says that just deserts is a necessary condition of 
criminal punishment, that criminal punishment cannot be just 
unless the person punished committed criminal wrongdoing and is 
being punished for that wrongdoing.62 Strong retributivism says that 
just deserts (criminal wrongdoing) is a sufficient condition of criminal 
punishment, that criminal punishment should always be inflicted for 
57. See BARTON, supra note 24, at 10; BOONIN, supra note 11, at 85; FLETCHER, 
supra note 12, at 415; Dolinko, supra note 40, at 1626; RAWLS, supra note 11, at 21-22; 
Mackie, supra note 15, at 4. 
58. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 149-52; Bradley, supra note 18, at 20; Finnis, 
supra note 24, at 99; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 86-93; Herbert Morris, Persons and 
Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 483 (1968). But see Mackie, supra note 15, at 5 ("It is 
often suggested that by being punished a criminal pays a debt to society. But how can 
this be, unless what he suffers does some good to society? Reparation might be 
justified in this way, but reparations are clearly different from punishments .... "). 
59. See BARTON, supra note 24, at 5; MOORE, supra note 11, at 150·51; 
Christopher, Deterring Retributivism, supra note 11, at 864 n.113; Dais, supra note 19, 
at 112; Dolinko, supra note 40, at 1642; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 79, 91-92; 
Morris, supra note 58, at 485-86; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on 
Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 284, 291-92 (1972); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of 
Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 30-31 (2003). 
60. See Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: 
Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. l, 19 n.68 
(2012); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.1329, 1333 (2009); Dan M. Kahan & Martha 
C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 
340 (1996); Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not 
Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, 48 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1299, 1345, 1363 (2011); von Hirsch, supra note 14, at 121. 
61. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 88-89, 153-154; Shawn J. Bayern, The 
Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of 
Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV.l, 3 (2009); Duff & Garland, supra note 11, at 7 
(making a similar distinction in terms of "negative" and "positive" retributivism); 
Mackie, supra note 15, at 4 (distinguishing among "negative retributivism, the 
principle that one who is not guilty must not be punished," "positive retributivism, the 
principle that one who is guilty ought to be punished," and "permissive retributivism, 
[the principle] that one who is guilty may be punished."). 
62. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 88. 
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criminal wrongdoing.63 
While weak retributivism is accepted by all but a few radical 
consequentialists who believe that it is sometimes morally 
permissible to knowingly punish an innocent person,64 strong 
retributivism is much more controversial. There are at least two 
objections against it, two arguments that mere just deserts is not a 
sufficient condition for just punishment. First, other conditions-
especially due process and all the conditions that due process 
entails-are necessary.65 Second, there are situations in which a 
person committed a crime and is afforded due process but still does 
not deserve punishment, at least by the state. These include 
situations in which the person committed the crime with a 
recognized excuse or justification, the person has already been 
punished proportionately by non-state actors,66 the person deserves 
forgiveness or mercy,67 or the crime is de minimis.68 
Given the minimality of weak retributivism and the two 
problems with strong retributivism, I suggest that retributivists 
adopt a "middle-of-the-road option"-moderate retributivism. 
Moderate retributivism says that (a) it is generally a good thing in 
itself (and not because of any expected consequences) if a person 
receives her just deserts and therefore that (b) if a person commits a 
crime, then it is generally a good thing in itself if, after receiving due 
process, she receives proportional punishment for this crime. 
Regarding (b), proportionality is built in to moderate 
retributivism. Once again, retributivism is all about just deserts, and 
just-ness-or justice-implies proportionality.69 It is clearly not just 
but unjust deserts-an injustice to the offender-if she is punished 
far more than her crime merits.10 So a person who receives twenty-
five years in prison for stealing a $10 item may legitimately claim 
that her punishment does not "fit the crime"; that-given the 
interests, values, and rights that her crime tends to impair and the 
actual harm suffered by the victim-her crime merits much less 
63. See id. at 83, 88, 91-92, 104-105, 153-154, 173, 180. 
64. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (" ... nor shall any State deprive any person 
oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw ... "). 
66. See HUSAK, supra note 14, at 201-02; Husak, Retribution, supra note 18, at 
972-73; Zaibert, supra note 23, at 100. 
67. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
68. See Husak, supra note 16, at 350. 
69. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 4-5; ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 209; von Hirsch, 
supra note 14, at 115. 
70. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) ("The Eighth Amendment 
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids 
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."). 
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punishment. 71 It is also clearly unjust-an injustice to the victim and 
to all similarly situated offenders who are punished more harshly-if 
the offender is punished far less than her crime merits.72 So a 
defendant who is sentenced to only thirty days in jail for a violent 
rape is not "paying" nearly what he "owes." 
In addition to justice itself, there are both a consequentialist 
reason and an expressivist reason for proportionality as well. 
Regarding the former, disproportionate punishment erodes 
enforcement of, and respect for, the law.73 To consider an extreme 
example, suppose that parking tickets were punished by life in prison 
without parole.74 At first, it might seem that this kind of law would 
fully eliminate all illegal parking. And maybe it would-initially. 
But sooner or later, the conscience of the community would step in 
and thwart enforcement of this law. The public would stop reporting 
parking offenses, police would stop writing parking tickets, 
prosecutors would stop trying recipients of these tickets, and judges 
and juries would stop convicting parking-ticket defendants-all of 
them out of fear of helping contribute to grave injustice. Conversely, 
if serious crimes were under-punished-for example, the statutory 
sentence for first degree murder were reduced from life in prison to a 
maximum of one year in prison-judges and juries would routinely 
nullify the statutory limit and recommend far greater sentences. 
The expressivist reason for proportional punishment is simple: 
to convey both to the criminal and to the community just how grave 
or serious her crime was. 75 In general, the "message" conveyed by 
harsher punishment is that the crime was worse than crimes that 
receive lesser punishment. Still, it is important to realize that this 
near-platitude oversimplifies the situation. 
Most crimes prescribe a range of punishment, a range that 
allows for judicial discretion. 76 Three factors determine the statutory 
ranges: (i) the relative importance of the interests, values, or rights 
that the crime opposes or impairs; (ii) the punishments that other 
crimes receive; and (iii) the relative "rankings" of these crimes (for 
example, murder is considered to be worse than burglary and 
71. I leave aside the objection that she does deserve life in prison if this is her third 
felony in a "three strikes" jurisdiction. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003). 
72. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 98-102; von Hirsch, supra note 14, at 126. 
73. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 209; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 477-78 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2450-51 (1997). 
74. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
75. See Hampton, supra note 15, at 13; Schopp, supra note 14, at 110; von Hirsch, 
supra note 14, at 125. 
76. See generally Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in 
Criminal Sentencing, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 693 (2005). 
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burglary worse than criminal trespass).77 So, m any given 
jurisdiction, the range of punishment for murder is going to be 
harsher than the ranges of punishment for attempted murder, rape, 
and burglary because it is the only crime among these four that 
violates the most important interest, value, and right that we have-
life. 
Once the range of punishment has been specified by statute, a 
judge will determine how much punishment within that range a 
particular criminal receives. But what determines the particular 
punishment that the judge picks within this range? The degree of 
punishment that a judge considers to be proportional to a given 
criminal act within the statutory range will depend on three main 
factors: (a) the magnitude of harm, if any, caused by the criminal act 
(for example, a $100 theft as opposed to a $50,000 theft); (b) various 
characteristics of the offender, such as her age, mental condition, 
history, and reason(s) for committing the criminal act; and (c) any 
aggravating, mitigating, or exculpatory circumstances. 78 
The upshot of all this is that proportional punishment only 
partially communicates the gravity of the crime being punished. 
Statutory ranges, which are determined entirely by the community's 
(legislature's) estimation of the gravity of the crime in the abstract, 
are only the starting point, not the end point. For example, in the 
abstract, we regard rape as a much worse crime than armed 
robbery.79 But given the other factors that go into determining 
proportional punishment, it may very well be that some armed 
robbers are punished more harshly than some rapists-even in the 
same jurisdiction. A defendant found guilty of armed robbery might 
be given a harsher sentence (say, fifteen years) than a defendant 
found guilty of rape (say, ten years) because two different judges, or 
maybe the same judge in two different cases, picked two different 
points in the different ranges-a lower point in the rape range and a 
higher point in the armed-robbery range-on the basis of different 
evaluations of the different harms that each crime caused and the 
different circumstances under which each crime was committed. 
III. Two REASONS WHY RETRIBUTMSM NEEDS CONSEQUENTIALISM 
In this Part, I will offer two arguments for the central thesis of 
this Article: retributivism does not work-that is, does not succeed 
in explaining why we punish-unless we supplement it with 
consequentialism. In Part VI, I will offer yet a third argument for 
this conclusion. 
77. See id. 
78. See generally von Hirsch, supra note 14, at 128-30. 
79. See id. 
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A. Why Do Retributivists Insist on Inflicting Just Negative 
Deserts? 
If not for consequentialist reasons like crime minimization, why 
are most people-and all retributivists by definition-so concerned 
that criminals receive the punishment that they deserve in the first 
place? Retributivists cannot answer this question merely by 
responding that the State should give everybody, not just criminals, 
their just deserts. There are two reasons why this response would 
fail. 
First, it simply fails to capture a certain psychological 
asymmetry. We are much more outraged to hear that a criminal 
suspect is acquitted (for example, because of a procedural or 
evidentiary technicality) or under-punished (for example, receives 
only a few years in prison for a heinous crime) than to hear that an 
exceptionally virtuous person was not sufficiently rewarded or 
praised, whether by the State or by anybody else. In fact, we are not 
really outraged that the latter did not receive the recognition and 
appreciation that she deserves. Instead, we are-at most-mildly 
disappointed or sad or sympathetic. The point is that whatever 
emotion we feel, it is much less negative and intense than the 
outrage that we feel toward the criminal justice system's comparable 
failure to give a criminal the punishment that she deserves. 
Second, the notion that we are concerned that criminals receive 
their just deserts because we are concerned that all people receive 
their just deserts is simply not true. The fact of the matter is that the 
(modern) State is much more concerned that criminals receive their 
just-i.e., negative-deserts than that the exceptionally virtuous 
receive their just-i.e., positive-deserts. It has not set up any system 
or institution that is designed to make sure that the exceptionally 
virtuous among us receive praise or reward.so To be sure, the 
military honors soldiers who show exceptional bravery, and the 
government-or at least some government officials-bestow lavish 
praise from time to time on various individuals who have 
demonstrated exceptional achievement, generosity, or heroism.s1 But, 
again, we have no virtue justice system to complement our criminal 
justice system, no State-mandated apparatus systematically 
designed to make sure that the exceptionally virtuous are found and 
80. Cf. Mackie, supra note 15, at 7 (asking why virtuous acts merit praise/reward 
as a response in the first place). Mackie's question, then, is the mirror-image of the 
question that I am asking here about retributivism: why do we think that criminal 
acts merit punishment as a response? 
81. Michael Reynolds, Army Ranger Cory Remsburg Honored as Hero During State 
of the Union Address, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2014, 8:24 PM), 
http ://usnews.nbcnews.com/ _news/2014/01/28/2248 7 629-army-ranger-cory · remsburg · 
honored-as-hero-during-state-of· the-union -address?lite. 
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given their just deserts (praise and rewards) with the same zeal and 
solemnity that the criminal among us are found and given their just 
deserts (blame and punishment).82 
B. The First Consequentialist Explanation: Practicability 
Retributivists may respond that it is much more important for 
the State to see to it that criminals receive their just deserts than 
that the virtuous receive their just deserts. But it is not clear that 
they can defend this point without resorting to non-retributivist-i.e., 
consequentialist-considerations.83 As it turns out, the reasons for 
the state's asymmetrical emphasis on dispensing negative desert 
over positive desert are all consequentialist. 
First, when it comes to maximizing protection of our supremely 
valued interests, which is, as we saw in Part II, one of the State's 
main concerns and duties, it is more important that the State 
incentivize compliance with the law than the performance of 
supererogatory acts. Second, it is much easier to determine when a 
criminal law has been violated than when a given act is virtuous. The 
former is, for the most part, a question of objective fact; the latter is, 
for the most part, a matter of subjective opinion because it requires 
two highly subjective judgments-one regarding what the standards 
of virtue are and the other regarding whether or not a given act 
meets these standards. Third, there are (fortunately) many more 
instances of virtuous activity than there are of criminal activity. As a 
result, a virtue justice system, especially if it was concerned to treat 
all equally virtuous people equally, would have to be immense--
much bigger than the taxpayers could afford-to fulfill the 
monitoring, evaluation, and decision demands placed upon it.84 
Again, these are all good explanations of why the State is not 
nearly as concerned to bestow positive desert as well as negative 
desert. But they are not retributivist explanations; they are not non-
consequentialist, desert-based reasons. By itself, then, retributivism 
fails to explain why the state should be much more concerned with 
inflicting negative desert than bestowing positive desert.85 So we now 
have one very good reason why retributivism must be supplemented 
by consequentialism. 
C. The Second Consequentialist Explanation: Revenge 
There is yet a second reason why retributivism should be 
82. This asymmetrical emphasis on dispensing just negative deserts over just 
positive deserts is ironic when we consider that the latter is much easier to justify than 
the former. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 53. 
83. See Mackie, supra note 15, at 4; Rosebury, supra note 8, at 18-19. 
84. See HUSAK, supra note 14, at 205-06. 
85. See Hampton, supra note 14, at 235-36. 
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supplemented by consequentialism. Most people agree that criminals 
should receive their just deserts.SB But retributivists go further than 
merely subscribing to this proposition. They have made this the very 
centerpiece of their theory. They have assigned a higher status and 
significance to just deserts than they have to any consequentialist 
desiderata (such as deterrence). The question is: why? Why are just 
deserts so important? Why do retributivists feel so strongly that 
criminals should get what they deserve? 
Retributivists are likely to answer these questions with a single 
word: justice. They want criminals to get their just deserts because 
they want justice-pure and simple. But the kind of justice 
retributivists want is not distributive justice, procedural justice, or 
restorative justice. The kind of justice that retributivists want is-as 
their label suggests-retributive justice. What, then, is retributive 
justice? What does retributive justice mean? It cannot mean simply 
that criminals receive their just deserts. There are two reasons. 
First, this explanation would fail to distinguish retributive justice 
from either distributive justice or restorative justice; both of these 
kinds of justice also involve giving people their just deserts. Second, 
it would amount to a circular explanation. If retributive justice just 
meant criminals getting their just deserts, then to say that 
retributivists want criminals to get their just deserts because they 
want justice is just to say that retributivists want criminals to get 
their just deserts because they want criminals to get their just 
deserts. This is not an explanation; this is an unhelpful tautology. 
It remains to be explained, then, what retributive justice even 
means beyond criminals receiving their just deserts and why 
retributivists want it. My answer to these questions is that there is 
nothing about the notion of just deserts itself that motivates 
retributivists. In itself, the thesis that criminals should get their just 
deserts is a mere truism, a virtually empty abstraction. Nor is it 
merely a brute, inexplicable fact that retributivists want criminals to 
receive their just deserts or regard criminals receiving their just 
deserts as an inherent good, a positive value in its own right. The 
real reason why retributivists so passionately adhere to this 
otherwise unmotivated abstraction is because a powerful emotion 
pushes them toward it: vengeance.s7 
Retributivists-like many, if not most, human beings-
instinctively wish to return harm for (unjustified and unexcused) 
harm.ss They-we-feel the urge to hurt another person who has, we 
86. Kevin M. Carlsmith, et al., "R'hy Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as 
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 287 (2002). 
87. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
88. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 211; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 87; Mackie, 
supra note 15, at 6. 
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feel, unjustifiably and inexcusably hurt us. This desire for revenge is 
rooted in the deeper, instinctive desire to maintain our supremely 
valued interests against unjustified and unexcused injury by 
others.89 So when another person frustrates this desire, we naturally 
react with such negative feelings as anger, resentment, indignation, 
and sometimes humiliation.9o These feelings are not pleasant or 
comfortable. Like any other kind of emotional suffering, we would 
prefer to discharge them as quickly as possible.91 And the most 
effective short-term way to achieve this catharsis, to alleviate or 
eliminate this emotional distress, is by acting upon the urge to injure 
the perpetrator's supremely valued interests in turn, to show her how 
it feels.92 We feel tremendous satisfaction in putting the perpetrator 
in the same position that she put us (the victim). This turning of the 
crime against the perpetrator helps to restore our sense of emotional 
equilibrium.93 And here's the rub: because achieving this emotional 
equilibrium, this righteous satisfaction, is retributivism's goal or 
objective, retributivism-once again-needs consequentialism. Call 
this proposal that vengeance motivates both retributivism and 
(therefore) criminal punishment the Motivation Thesis. 
One might immediately object that the Motivation Thesis is just 
wrong, that criminal punishment is not motivated by vengeance any 
more than parental punishment is motivated by vengeance. When a 
father F punishes his son S-say, for hitting his older sister-F's 
purpose is not at all to exact revenge against S. While he may or may 
not be angry with S, a desire to alleviate this anger by hurting S is 
not what motivates F to give S a "time-out" or ground him. (And if 
this desire does motivate F, then we may seriously call into question 
his parenting and his character.) Instead, Fis motivated by two other 
desires: (a) the desire to educate S and (b) the desire to reform S. 
Regarding (a), F wishes to teach S-through the "language" of 
89. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, .J., concurring); 
BARTON, supra note 24, at xiv, 15; OLIVER W. HOLl\lES, JR., THE COMl\WN LAW 41 
(1881); MOORE, supra note 11. at 99; PINKER, supra note 29, at 529-30; JAi\lES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 149, 151-52 (1882); Jones, supra 
note 10, at 1049 ("The desire for revenge 'is a current, deep American trait.' . . . 
[R]evenge is a natural human trait, one that seeks the expression of a deep, primitive 
desire to impose a counter bad act upon those who have caused harm. When a person 
has been a victim of cruelty, it is her natural inclination to seek to victimize the 
victimizer. The criminal justice system satisfies this desire by allowing the victim and 
society to act upon their revenge through the imposition of harsh criminal sentences.") 
(citations omitted). 
90. See ALEXA>IDER & FERZA>l, supra note 32, at 6; BARTON, supra note 24, at 13; 
FRENCH, supra note 26, at x, 81; MOORE, supra note 11, at 141, 164; RACHEL SIMMONS, 
ODD GIRL OUT: THE HIDDEN CULTURE OF AGGRESSION IN GIRLS 139 (2002). 
91. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 530-31. 
92. See BARTON, supra note 24, at 17-18. 
93. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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punishment-that he should not hit his sister. Regarding (b), F 
hopes that the punishment will help to deter this kind of behavior-
violence against others-in the future. The same, then, can be said of 
criminal punishment. It is designed solely to educate and reform, not 
to avenge.94 Put in slightly different terms, criminal punishment, like 
parental punishment, is motivated solely by consequential concerns, 
not by retributivist concerns; solely by the expected good 
consequences of punishment, not by the gratifying prospect of seeing 
the guilty party finally "get his." It is easy to see why this is 
sometimes referred to as the "paternalistic" theory of punishment.95 
There is something to the paternalist theory. Certainly, criminal 
punishment for harmless crimes-for example, drug possession, 
resisting arrest, and perjury-is similar to parental punishment 
insofar as the sole purposes of both forms of punishment (with 
respect to the punished individual) are to educate and reform, not to 
avenge. (I will develop this point further in Part VI.) But criminal 
punishment for harmful crimes differs from parental punishment in 
at least two ways. First, harmful crimes are generally much more 
serious than most children's worst wrongdoing. Of course, if a child 
commits a crime-or an act that would be criminal if she were old 
enough-then parental punishment may not be sufficient; the state 
may very well need to get involved. But if the child's anti-social 
action does not rise to the level of a crime (or serious tort), then-by 
definition-it is not as serious (harmful) as even a criminal 
misdemeanor. And corresponding to these different levels of harm 
are different attitudes. While the parent's attitude in punishing the 
94. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 180-84; Hampton, supra note 14, at 216, 237-38. 
But see BOONIN, supra note 11, at 184-92 (critiquing the moral-education approach); 
HUSAK, supra note 14, at 88 (same). 
95. See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 14, at 88; Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory 
of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981), reprinted in A READER ON PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 11, at 95. According to supporters of the paternalistic theory of 
punishment-or rehabilitationists-punishment is possibly the most effective means of 
reforming a criminal-i.e., of getting the criminal to regret her criminal act, feel 
remorse for her victim, internalize the moral norms of the law, and thereby convert 
her into a law-abiding member of society. See, e.g., Margaret M. Falls, Retribution, 
Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 6 L. & PHIL. 25, 44, 46 (1987); PINKER, supra note 
29, at 540; Hampton, supra note 14, at 237; Morris, supra, at 98-99. Some scholars, 
however, oppose rehabilitation as a purpose or justification of criminal punishment on 
the grounds that it is overly paternalistic, "coerced therapy" that is inflicted on the 
offender "for her own good." See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 415-16; MOORE, 
supra note 11, at 86-87; Murphy, supra note 58, at 291-92. But see Dolinko, supra note 
40, at 1645-46 (arguing that, contrary to retributivists, rehabilitation is not necessarily 
any more demeaning or disrespectful than punishment). Whether or not retributivists 
regard rehabilitation as a goal of punishment depends on how vengeful they are; the 
more they want the offender to "pay" for her crime, the less they tend to value her 
becoming a better person. At its extreme, the retributive sentiment tends to work 
against the concern for rehabilitation, as is reflected in such statements as, "After 
what she did, she does not deserve a second chance." 
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"lower-level" anti-social activity is purely consequentialist, the 
criminal justice system's attitude-or at least the attitude of various 
people in the criminal justice system, especially the prosecutors and 
the victims-toward the "higher- level" anti-social activity is partly 
retributivist. 
Second, parents stand in a very different relation to their 
children than does the criminal justice system to criminals.96 
Because the former generally love their children, they are much less 
likely to want to see their children hurt for any reason, including 
avenging the harm that they cause. On the other hand, the criminal 
justice system-especially the prosecutors and the victims-typically 
do not stand in a loving, nurturing relationship with offenders. On 
the contrary, victims often bear nothing but anger and resentment 
toward criminals. And prosecutors generally attempt to represent 
and vindicate these attitudes. Admittedly, there are situations when 
victims do stand in a loving relationship with their assailants. 
Perhaps the best example is domestic violence.97 Victims of domestic 
violence are much more likely than most other kinds of victims to 
forgive perpetrators, blame themselves or the police, and withdraw 
their complaints.98 But this kind of situation is the exception, not the 
rule. In the vast majority of cases, cases in which there is no loving 
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, forgiveness, 
self-blame, and withdrawal of complaints are much less likely than 
anger, resentment, and a vengeful desire to see the perpetrator "get 
his" for what he did.99 
D. Why Revenge Is Not Irrational 
One might argue that revenge is nonsensical or irrational 
because it tries to do what is impossible-namely, annul or undo the 
harm that the criminal inflicted.100 This annulling or undoing is 
96. See BOONIN, supra note 11, at 190-92. 
97. Sexual violence is another example. See MARCUS BERZOFSKYET AL., U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 
1994-2010, 7 (2013), , available at 
http://www. bj s. gov/index.cfm ?ty=pbdetail&iid=4594. 
98. See Dennis Feeney, Jr., Note, Ensuring the Domestic Violence Victim a Means 
of Communication: Why Passing Legislation That Criminalizes Impairing Another's 
Communication Is the Next Logical Step in Combating Domestic Violence, 32 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 167, 186 n.87 (2007); Diksha Munjal, Intimate Partner Violence-ls 
There a Solution?, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 34 7, 357 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
99. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 71, 81 (1980) ("To be sure, even a public enforcement system relies to 
some extent on the 'thirst for revenge' which motivates victims and sometimes even 
bystanders to assist the police. That a victim of crime is quite likely to complain to the 
police and appear as a witness at the trial of the offender, all without compensation, is 
some evidence that a genetic disposition to retaliate has survived .... "). 
100. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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impossible because the past simply cannot be undone.101 There is no 
use crying over spilt milk because the milk simply cannot be un-spilt. 
Even if the victim makes a full recovery, which is not always the 
case, she still suffered at least some physical, psychological, or 
economic harm and had to spend at least some valuable time and 
effort recovering from it.102 Indeed, the objection continues, undoing 
the crime is impossible even in situations where restitution can be 
made because there is still irreversible moral harm, the harm of 
having one's rights, humanity, dignity, and autonomy violated.103 If, 
for example, a thief steals $5000 from a victim and is later caught, 
the $5000 can, and might very well, be returned to the victim. But 
because the initial violation, the stealing itself and the disrespectful 
attitude that it represents, is in the past, it cannot be undone. 
To be sure, it does seem rather strange that revenge should ever 
bring about any emotional equilibrium in the first place. It is strange 
because the emotional equilibrium does not seem to reflect any 
metaphysical equilibrium. But things are not really as strange as 
they may first appear. When the state punishes a criminal, it is not 
undoing the crime. That would be establishing metaphysical 
equilibrium because it would involve changing the past, which is 
impossible. Rather, the state is reducing the criminal's rights and 
powers to roughly the same degree that he previously reduced the 
victim's rights and power when he committed the crime. While the 
perpetrator indicated through his crime that his rights and interests 
were superior to his victim's, criminal punishment negates that 
message and puts the perpetrator back into his non-superior, equal 
position. By restoring the equality between perpetrator and victim, 
and by communicating that the perpetrator's rights and interests are 
not superior to his victim's rights and interests, criminal punishment 
helps to restore not metaphysical equilibrium but moral and social 
equilibrium.104 
101. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 110; Dais, supra note 19, at 107; Finnis, supra 
note 24, at 102; Hampton, supra note 14, at 236; Mackie, supra note 15, at 5; see also 
Beth Sullivan, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact 
Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601, 632-33 (1998) ("The death penalty cannot bring back the dead 
.... Wounds that cut as deep as these never will be healed by the death of another. 
That is simply not the nature of the healing process, and it is not the purpose or the 
intent of the criminal justice system.") (footnotes omitted). 
102. See Hershenov, supra note 14, at 87. 
103. See Fletcher, supra note 24, at 102. 
104. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Finnis, supra note 24, at 102 
("[T]he purpose of retributive punishment is forward-looking, and not in vain .... 
Punishment does not negate the crime, but it does negate, cancel out, the advantage 
the offender gained in the crime-the advantage not necessarily of loot or 
psychological satisfaction, but of having pursued one's own purposes even when the 
law required that one refrain from doing so."). 
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The emotional equilibrium then follows this restoration of the 
moral and social order. Given our peculiar moral psychology, the 
victim's knowledge that the criminal has been restored to equal 
status-that is, has been put as far below his prior baseline as he 
previously put the victim below her baseline-helps to make her feel 
better about the entire situation. So revenge is not irrational. It does 
not motivate us to try to undo what cannot be undone. On the 
contrary, it very rationally motivates us to try to do the next best 
thing to undoing the harms-namely, undoing the moral and social 
inequality and bad feelings that these harms cause and represent. At 
the time that the offender committed the crime, he enriched himself 
in some way-usually emotionally or financially-at the expense of 
the victim. Retaliation in the form of criminal punishment helps to 
compensate for this unjust enrichment by justly enriching the 
victim-specifically, her relative moral and social status and 
emotional state-at the expense of the criminal.105 
E. Our Peculiar Moral Psychology 
In the second sentence of the previous paragraph, I attributed 
our vengeful satisfaction at seeing criminals punished to "our 
peculiar moral psychology." My point is that our widespread belief in 
retributive justice is very much a reflection of our very human moral 
psychology. Specifically, our desire to achieve retributive justice-
just deserts-is not sui generis but is itself motivated by a deeper 
desire, the desire for revenge.106 We believe that it is (a) just to 
punish criminals in proportion to the moral severity of their crimes 
and (b) unjust not to punish them or to under-punish them not 
because (a) and (b) are self-evident principles or because dispensing 
105. See WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 339; Bradley, supra note 18, at 23. Importantly, 
my statement that the offender unjustly enriches herself at the expense of her victim 
refers not merely to the kinds of enrichment that most would recognize as valuable but 
rather to whatever the offender herself considers valuable, even if it is just enhanced 
pleasure. In this way, my point differs from Herbert Morris's otherwise superficially 
similar point that offenders unfairly reap benefits from their crimes that most other 
people deny themselves by complying with the law and therefore that the state must 
punish them in order to restore a level playing field. Morris, supra note 58, at 478. The 
problem that Morris's theory runs into (and my point here does not) is that it accounts 
only for a narrow group of crimes-namely, crimes yielding benefits that most law-
abiding citizens recognize as benefits, such as money or insider information. It does not 
capture most other crimes-namely, crimes that benefit or please the people who 
commit them but would not benefit or please most law-abiding people if they were to 
engage in the same activity, such as rape or kidnapping. For similar criticisms of 
Morris's benefits/burdens version of retributivism, see BOONIN, supra note 11, at 122-
43; FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 417-18; HUSAK, supra note 14, at 86-87; Dolinko, 
supra note 11, at 414-16; Hampton, supra note 15, at 4-5; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 
82-84; Mackie, supra note 15, at 5; Ristroph, supra note 18, at 1299; von Hirsch, supra 
note 14, at 116-18. 
106. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
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just deserts is obviously a good end in itself but because we are the 
kind of beings who desire (proportional) revenge in response to 
culpable causation of harm. Without this particular, if not peculiar, 
psychological configuration, retributive justice would not be justice in 
the first place. This is a point that most retributivists, who tend to 
work entirely within the normative, non-psychological framework of 
just deserts, simply miss. 
Of course, we can certainly imagine intelligent beings who react 
to crime-that is, to deliberately inflicted injuries against their 
supremely valued interests-either (a) with the same anger, 
resentment, etc. but without a corresponding urge to retaliate or (b) 
not with anger, resentment, etc. (and therefore not with a 
corresponding urge to retaliate) but rather with sadness, regret, 
indifference, resignation, or forgiveness. Indeed, we need not look to 
other species, extraterrestrial or earthly, to find these non-vengeful 
beings. Some of them are human. People like Mother Theresa, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Mahatma Gandhi 
come to mind.101 How, then, do we account for this state of affairs? If, 
as I am suggesting, vengeance is instinctive and therefore universal 
among human beings, why do some, if not many, humans react to 
some crimes with non-vengeful feelings? 
There are several reasons. First, to say that vengeance is our 
peculiar instinctive response to victimization is not to say that it 
cannot be overridden by more powerful impulses or emotions that the 
situation may trigger. Indeed, it is likely that most of us have sexual 
instincts. But this hardly means that every situation-even 
provocative ones-will equally trigger these instincts. Other forces 
such as socialization or stress may counteract them. Second, in many 
situations, people are too emotionally distanced from the victims. 
Even the most horrific crimes rarely move most of us because we do 
not know the victim, and we have (unfortunately) heard about too 
many other anonymous victims to invest our emotions in any 
particular one of them.1os Third, to say that vengeance is a powerful 
107. So does Viktor Frankl, one of the few survivors of the Nazi concentration 
camps. According to William J. Winslade: 
[Frankl] believed strongly in reconciliation rather than revenge; he once 
remarked, 'I do not forget a good deed done to me, and I do not carry a 
grudge for a bad one.' Notably, he renounced the idea of collective guilt. 
Frankl was able to accept that his Viennese colleagues and neighbors may 
have known about or even participated in his persecution, and he did not 
condemn them for failing to join the resistance or die heroic deaths. Instead, 
he was deeply committed to the idea that even a vile Nazi criminal or a 
seemingly hopeless madman has the potential to transcend evil or insanity 
by making responsible choices. 
William J. Winslade, Afterword, in VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 
(Ilse Lasch trans. (pt. I), Beacon Press 2006) 162 (1946). 
108. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 21. 
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human instinct is not to suggest that it is deeply rooted in all human 
beings to the same degree. Some are more vengeful than others. 
Fourth, we can unlearn revenge, just as we can unlearn, or at least 
learn to control, most other natural instincts. And this fact only 
proves rather than refutes the point. The natural instinct was 
already there; otherwise, there was nothing to be unlearned or 
controlled in the first place. 
F. Nozick's Distinctions Between Retribution and Revenge 
The Motivation Thesis, which (again) says that vengeance 
motivates both retributivism and therefore criminal punishment, 
should strike the reader as both trivial and controversial. It is trivial 
to the extent that the definitions of revenge and criminal punishment 
are so similar. While criminal punishment is the intentional 
infliction of harm, deprivation, or suffering by the state in return for 
a proven violation of its criminal laws,109 revenge is a desire to 
inflict-or the infliction itself of-harm, deprivation, or suffering in 
return for a perceived wrong or injustice.110 Given these two 
definitions, it is hardly surprising to learn that the latter (revenge) 
helps to motivate the former (criminal punishment). 
But the Motivation Thesis is still controversial. Despite the 
similarity just noted between the definition of criminal punishment 
and the definition of revenge, most-including retributivists-regard 
revenge and criminal punishment with opposite attitudes. While 
most believe that the institution of criminal punishment is a good 
thing, in theory if not also in practice, they also think that vengeance 
is simply wrong, something "primitive," "mindless," "barbaric," 
"base," "animal," or "cruel."111 They argue that while we may be able 
109. See supra note 40, and accompanying text. 
110. See RA.'IDOM HOUSE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1647 (2nd ed. 1987) (defining revenge 
as "the act of revenging; retaliation for injuries or wrongs; vengeance ... the desire to 
revenge; vindictiveness."); see also Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, In Aid of Transitional 
Justice: Eroding Norms of Revenge in Countries with Weak State Authority, 10 UCLA 
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 541, 546 (2005) ("I define revenge as a response to an actual 
or perceived harm. The manner of such response explicates, in the eyes of the average 
person, the connection between the harm and the response. Furthermore, such a 
response confers on the responder the feeling or the perception of a counterbalancing 
benefit to himself."); PINKER, supra note 29, at 530 ("Revenge is, quite literally, an 
urge."). 
111. See BARTON, supra note 24, at 9; HART, supra note 18, at 234-35; Murphy, 
supra note 27, at 3; VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 46; Timo Airaksinen, Commentary: 
'Against Retributivism': An Evaluation, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 
11, at 101, 102-03; Christopher, Deterring Retributivism, supra note 11, at 848-49; 
Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 438-39 (2008); 
Hershenov, supra note 14, at 86-87; Markel, supra note 18, at 1429-30; Zaibert, supra 
note 23, at 117-18; see also Steiker, supra note 47, at 30 ("Once ... determinations of 
culpability are made by law, they reinforce social and systemic tendencies toward 
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to understand victims' and society's vengeful desire to retaliate 
against criminals, it is still wrong for society to act on this feeling. 
We should no more act on it than we should act on any other 
understandable but ignominious motive. Given this stark difference 
in attitudes toward criminal punishment and revenge, it seems 
difficult to maintain that the latter motivates the former. 
Perhaps the most prominent defender of this view is Robert 
Nozick. Nozick argues that criminal punishment bears a much closer 
relationship to retribution than to revenge.112 While these two words 
are often taken to be synonymous, Nozick makes five distinctions 
between them: 
l. Retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done for 
an injury or harm or slight and need not be for a wrong. 
2. Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the 
punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas 
revenge internally need set no limit to what is inflicted .... 
3. Revenge is personal: 'this is because of what you did to my 
___ ' (self, father, group, and so on). Whereas the agent of 
retribution need have no special or personal tie to the victim of the 
wrong for which he exacts retribution. 
4. Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the 
suffering of another, while retribution either need involve no 
emotional tone, or involves another one, namely, pleasure at justice 
being done .... 
5. There need be no generality in revenge. Not only is the revenger 
not committed to revenging any similar act done to anyone; he is 
not committed to avenging all done to himself. . . . Whereas the 
imposer of retribution, inflicting deserved punishment for a wrong, 
is committed to (the existence of some) general principles (prima 
facie) mandating punishment in other similar circumstances.113 
attitudes of smugness and even satisfaction in punishing 'evil' that are always latent 
in a society with deeply rooted religious attitudes toward personal responsibility for 
sin."). 
112. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366-68 (1981). 
113. Id.; see also FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 416-417 ("Retribution simply means 
that punishment is justified by virtue of its relationship to the offense that has been 
committed. It is obviously not to be identified with vengeance or revenge, any m-0re 
than love is to be identified with lust."); Hampton, supra note 24, at 138 ("[W]e can 
appreciate how close [retribution and revenge] are (so that many victims may slide, 
unaware, back and forth between them). Both responses involve the desire to inflict 
pain as a way of mastering another, and both see such mastery as making a point 
about the relative value of offender and victim. But the point each wants to make is 
different. The vengeful hater masters the offender either to make the offender low in 
rank in order to elevate herself or to reveal the offender as low in rank and thereby 
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If Nozick were correct, then one might very well conclude from 
these distinctions that, contrary to the Motivation Thesis, it is wrong, 
if not conceptually incoherent, to talk about the state's exacting 
revenge for an offender's crime. On this view, only the victim of the 
crime or her allies-i.e., non-state actors-can exact revenge. What 
the state exacts when it punishes crimes is retribution.114 
This Nozickian objection to the Motivation Thesis, however, 
warrants several responses.115 First, thus stated, it is merely a 
semantic point. When the state avenges a crime, we call it one 
thing-retribution; when a private citizen avenges a crime (or 
perceived transgression), we call it something else-simply revenge. 
Even if this semantic point is correct, it fails to rule out my 
substantive point-the Motivation Thesis-which, again, says that 
criminal punishment is generally motivated by vengeance against 
criminals for their criminal acts. None of Nozick's five distinctions 
explicitly rules out this possibility. 
reveal herself as higher . . . . The retributivist, on the other hand, wants incorrect 
evidence of superiority denied and the victim's value reaffirmed. The punitive mastery 
of the wrongdoer is perceived not as a competitive victory that elevates the victim but, 
rather, as a denial of the wrongdoer's claim to elevation over ... the victim."); Bradley, 
supra note 18, at 20-21 (distinguishing between retribution and revenge, at least an 
interpretation of revenge as barbaric); Brudner, supra note 24, at 95-96 ("We can say . 
. . that the necessary implication of A's intentional infringement of B's right is a 
negation of his own right to liberty .... This implication may be brought home to A 
through the medium of B's outraged feelings, or it may be executed by someone who 
disinterestedly wills the equal freedom of all persons. In the former case, retribution is 
revenge; in the latter case, it is punishment."); Finnis, supra note 24, at 102 
("Retributive punishment ... is ... remote indeed from revenge. Punishment cannot 
be imposed by the victim as such. Indeed, it cannot rightly be imposed on behalf of the 
victim as such, but only on behalf of the community of citizens willing to abide by the 
law."); Hershenov, supra note 14, at 86 (rejecting the view "that retribution is really 
revenge, though often disguised"). 
114. See HUSAK, supra note 14, at 200 n.103. 
115. See also BARTON, supra note 24, at 56-68 (arguing that none of Nozick's 
distinctions between revenge and retribution are correct); Rosebury, supra note 8, at 3 
(arguing that Nozick's fourth distinction is "surely wrong''); Zaibert, supra note 23, at 
92-114 (arguing that Nozick's distinctions fail to show that punishment differs in any 
meaningful way from revenge); id. at 117 -18 ("What I have criticized is the 
philosophical thesis which asserts that punishment and revenge are different by 
somehow attributing to revenge all sorts of bad features ... features which, by means 
of some sort of euphemistic alchemy are absent in punishment. The typical story goes 
roughly like this: only the emotions experienced by the avenger are vicious, only 
avengers unauthorizedly and inconsistently inflict disproportionate, grave harm in 
response to very minor slights .... I hope to have succeeded in showing, first, that 
avengers need not always conform to this story, and, second, that punishers are not 
exempt from conforming to it. To have ugly, base emotions, or to exaggerate one's 
concern for justice so much as to corrupt it, is not the monopoly of avengers .... The 
contrast between punishment and revenge in terms of justice versus barbarism, which 
in the end is what all these maneuvers amount to, can only be drawn if, in the final 
analysis, it is stipulated that punishment is just by definition, unlike revenge which is 
stipulated to be unjust by definition."). 
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Second, a supporter of Nozick's distinctions between retribution 
and revenge might argue that they help to show not merely the 
descriptive point that retributive punishment and revenge have 
different characteristics but also the normative point that retributive 
punishment is morally superior to revenge; that while retributive 
punishment is just, revenge is unjust; that while revenge has a base 
goal or motivation, retributive punishment has a much nobler goal or 
motivation. But Nozick's distinctions simply do not demonstrate this 
point. Nor do they show that retributive punishment is motivated by 
something other than vengeance. Indeed, the very meaning of the 
word retribution-namely, a "requital according to merits or deserts, 
esp[ecially] for evil"11B-suggests as much. So it is not at all clear 
from Nozick's distinctions how retribution is supposed to be morally 
superior to revenge. 
Third, contrary to Nozick, there are two very good reasons (in 
addition to those I offered in Part III.C) to think that, even though 
criminal punishment is inflicted by the state rather than by private 
citizens, it is still motivated by vengeance. First, one reason why it is 
the State-never the victim-that prosecutes criminals is because 
crimes are considered to victimize not merely the individual victims 
themselves but all individuals collectively. The society is victimized 
by the crime insofar as the criminal is breaking its law and thereby 
implicitly denouncing its moral values.111 So, even by Nozick's 
distinctions above, the state is exacting revenge-revenge against the 
criminal for victimizing it. 
The second reason for thinking that criminal punishment is 
motivated by vengeance is that the state is acting in place of the 
victim. It is helping the victim to do what she would ordinarily be 
powerless to do on her own. It is, in this sense, the victim's avenging 
agent, working on her behalf to make sure that the person who 
victimized her gets the punishment that he deserves for victimizing 
her. By assuming victims' burden of punishing the criminals who 
harm them, the state demonstrates that it shares and affirms the 
victim's motivations, that it also wants revenge for violations against 
116. RANDOM HOUSE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 110 at 1644. 
117. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMA.l\JN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BAJ~ALITY 
OF EVIL 261 (1963); FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 39; Bradley, supra note 18, at 23, 25; 
Colby, supra note 111, at 438 n.198; Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's 
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 990-91 (1985); Markel, supra note 18, at 1448-49; Linda 
Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1524 (2000). 
But see Murphy, supra note 23, at 93 n.5 ("[W)e hear much talk about crimes being 
offenses against the state or community as a whole-against the general rules of order 
in which all citizens have an equal stake. Because of this, it is often thought that all 
citizens have the same stake in demanding punishment for crime and that individual 
victims, therefore, should play no special role. But this is too simplistic. The rapist 
may be a free rider on the legal compliance of all of us, but only some very unfortunate 
subset of us suffer from him in ways that seriously undermine our actual well-being."). 
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its "client."ns 
IV. THE JUSTIFICATION THESIS 
Despite my responses to Nozick's five distinctions between 
retribution and revenge in the previous Part, one might argue that 
this is all sophistry, that revenge is obviously just plain wrong and 
therefore has no place in our criminal justice system. I offer two 
responses to this point. First, as a psychological matter, retributivists 
who think that their thirst for just deserts is not vengefully 
motivated may just be in denial. Again, they may be thinking that 
revenge is something bad and therefore cannot admit, either publicly 
or to themselves, to having vengeful feelings, at least not in the 
context of their support for giving criminals their just deserts. 
Second, if this first point is correct, retributivists need not feel this 
way about revenge in the first place. This all-too-common assumption 
that revenge is just plain wrong needs to be challenged. Of course, 
revenge can be ugly. Below, I will discuss what is undeniable: that 
revenge can be unjustified, misplaced, or excessive. But revenge also 
has a good side. The ultimate task of this Part is to bring this good 
side out. 
Specifically, I will defend what I call the Justification Thesis. 
While the Motivation Thesis says that revenge helps to motivate 
criminal punishment, the Justification Thesis says-even more 
controversially-that revenge helps to justify criminal punishment. 
According to the Justification Thesis, revenge that is prompted by 
genuine injustice is a very good thing; retributive justice just is 
righteous vengeance.119 I will start by showing that the arguments 
purporting to show that revenge is an unmitigated evil are weak. I 
will then argue-more positively-that revenge is not only morally 
permissible but also morally justified and therefore that the criminal 
justice system should reflect, as it does, this peculiar feature of our 
moral psychology. 
One thing I should make clear at the outset is that I am not 
guilty of the "naturalistic fallacy." That is, I am not reasoning from 
the way things are to the way things ought to be. I recognize that 
even if the Motivation Thesis is correct, it does not follow that the 
Justification Thesis is also correct; that even if I am correct that 
vengeance is (a) a natural, instinctive reaction to culpable 
wrongdoing and therefore (b) helps to motivate criminal punishment, 
it does not follow that vengeance is a good or right reaction or that it 
118. See FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 37-38; Fletcher, supra note 24, at 110; Markel, 
supra note 18, at 1445-46; Rosebury, supra note 8, at 13. 
119. See BARTON, supra note 24, at xiv-xvi; HOL.\fES, supra note 89, at 41; PINKER, 
supra note 29, at 538; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 80; see also Rosebury, supra note 
8, at 7, 10 (attributing this position to the sociologist Emile Durkheim and the 
repudiation of this position to Aristotle and Kant). 
2014] WHY RETRIBUTIVISM NEEDS CONSEQUENTIALISM 663 
should help to motivate criminal punishment. In fact, one might 
argue the very converse: that while vengeance is a natural, 
instinctive reaction to culpable wrongdoing, it is wrong and harmful 
and therefore that we should do whatever we can to resist and 
overcome it.120 So the Justification Thesis has not yet been 
demonstrated. It still requires arguments that are independent of the 
ones that I have made for the Motivation Thesis. I intend to provide 
these arguments in this section. 
A. Arguments Against Revenge 
Those who think that revenge is morally wrong may not simply 
assume this point, especially when others (such as myself) disagree 
with it.121 They need to provide an argument for this conclusion.122 As 
it turns out, the four main arguments offered against revenge tend to 
be rather weak. 
First, it is argued that religions repudiate revenge.123 For 
example, the Bible encourages a person who has been hit in one 
cheek to respond not with violence but by turning the other cheek.124 
But this argument is not very persuasive. First, such biblical 
passages amount to undefended assertions, not reasoned arguments. 
Second, while other biblical passages also repudiate returning an eye 
for an eye, 125 some of these-and other-biblical passages endorse 
divine vengeance.126 Third, not everybody is Christian, no less 
religious.121 Arguments that are derived from religion or religious 
texts will fail to persuade the vast secular among us. 
The second argument against revenge: revenge is impractical 
because it helps to perpetuate the "cycle of violence."12s Indeed, 
120. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; infra Parts V.A and V.C. 
121. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 111. 
122. See Rosebury, supra note 8, at 20. 
123. See Jean Hampton, Introduction: Forgiveness and Christianity, in 
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 23, at 10. 
124. Matthew 5:38. 
125. See Leviticus 19:18; Mark 11:25; Matthew 26:52; Proverbs 20:22, 24:29; Romans 
12:17; 1 Samuel 24:12; 1 Thessalonians 5:15. 
126. See Deuteronomy 28:47, 32:35; Exodus 20:1, 21:24, 34:6; Ezekiel 25:17; Genesis 
9:5; Hebrews 10:30; Nahum 1:2; Numbers 31:1; 1 Peter 2:13; 1 Romans 12:19, 13:14; see 
also FRENCH, supra note 26, at x ("[F]rom the Stoic-Christian point of view .... only 
God could be both pure enough and knowledgeable enough to administer vengeance in 
a morally fitting way. Leave it to heaven. Perhaps, but if God can play the part of the 
avenger, then vengeance cannot be all that bad."); Hampton, supra note 124, at 12 
("Jesus ... is frequently an angry man, reminding one of the Old Testament 
prophets."). 
127. See FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 417; FRENCH, supra note 26, at x. 
128. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 537-38; Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law 
and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 145, 166 (2010); Eisnaugle, 
supra note 47, at 210-11, 231-32; John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of 
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 
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banners and bumper stickers continue to replicate Mahatma 
Gandhi's (or at least India's independence movement's) maxim, "An 
eye for an eye makes the whole world blind."129 But poignant as this 
sentiment may be, it is not always true. First, not all revenge 
involves violence in the first place. Second, as an empirical matter, 
many acts of private revenge-and most acts of state-imposed 
revenge (that is, criminal punishment)-terminate the matter; they 
are not met with further retaliation.130 
The third argument against revenge: it is often, usually, or 
always for no good reason, against the wrong person, or against the 
right person to a degree that is disproportionate to the severity of 
that person's crime.131 While revenge certainly can be any of these 
things, the risk that it will be any of these things does not count as 
an argument against revenge itself. It counts only as an argument 
against "misapplying" revenge; as an argument not against revenge 
per se but against bad revenge-that is, against revenge that is 
unjustified, misplaced, or excessive.132 And there is no good reason to 
think that all, no less most, revenge is bad.133 The proper response, 
then, is not to condemn revenge per se. It is to condemn unjustified, 
misplaced, or excessive revenge. 
The fourth argument against revenge: even though tribalism is 
instinctive, it is wrong and therefore something that should be 
resisted and repudiated rather than encouraged. Likewise, then, 
with revenge. My first response to this argument by analogy, 
however, is that it relies entirely on the assumption that both 
524, 602 (2005); Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification 
of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 97 (2005); William A. Schabas, War 
Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REV. 733, 767 
(1997). 
129. Essential Quotes of Mahatma Gandhi, GANDI INT'L INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, 
http://www.gandhianpeace.com/quotes.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2014). 
130. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 538; Airaksinen, supra note 111, at 105. 
131. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 99-100. 
132. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) ("[T]his Court is 
compelled to conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out 
a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the 
condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the 
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the 
restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment."); Murphy, supra note 27, at 
4. For examples of bad revenge, see PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: 
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 367 (2008) ("It is apparent that 
revenge led to retaliation [at Abu Ghraib] against inmates who had rioted or who had 
allegedly raped a boy .... Humiliating and beating them up was 'teaching them a 
lesson' about the consequences of getting out of control. . . . Forcing detainees to 
simulate fellatio or to masturbate in public in front of women soldiers and then 
documenting this humiliation was more than just a tactic of embarrassment. It was 
the MPs' sexual scenarios as payback for detainees they felt had gone over the line."). 
133. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 108; Rosebury, supra note 8, at 18. 
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tribalism and revenge are instinctive. And being instinctive is hardly 
sufficient for being wrong; some of our instincts are clearly good or 
right or moral,134 So even if tribalism may be wrong, it hardly follows 
that revenge is also wrong. Tribalism may be wrong for reasons that 
simply do not apply to revenge. 
Second, it is certainly true that tribalism and, as I just argued, 
revenge can be wrong. But they are not always wrong. On the 
contrary, there are two reasons to think that they are often right or 
justified. First, both revenge and tribalism have served us humans 
well. They are expressions of ancient traits that gave us an 
evolutionary advantage.While tribalism reinforced group solidarity, 
which promoted individual survival, revenge helped to enforce 
primitive rules protecting life and property.135 Second, like revenge 
(as I will argue in the next two sections), tribalism still has a rightful 
place in the modern world. We not only tolerate but celebrate 
people's loyalty and devotion to family, school, community, team, 
culture, religion, and nation.136 
I conclude that the extant arguments against revenge are weak. 
In stark and ironic contrast, the arguments for revenge are strong. I 
say that this point is ironic because, as I mentioned in the 
134. See, e.g., MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 112-33. 
135. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 532 ("The necessity of vengeful punishment as a 
deterrent . . . has been demonstrated repeatedly in mathematical and computer 
models of the evolution of cooperation.") (endnote omitted); ROBINSON, supra note 36, 
at 43-44 (arguing that our penchant for retributive justice is very likely a product of 
evolution); Eyal Aharoni, Lisa L. Weintraub & Alan J. Fridlund, No Skin Off My Back: 
Retribution Deficits in Psychopathic Motives for Punishment, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 869, 
881 (2007) (endorsing "the hypothesis that retribution facilitates prosocial, cooperative 
behavior .... [P]unishment facilitates cooperation in iterated economic relationships .. 
. . Our data suggest that signals of intent may provide reliable input conditions for a 
retributive response given that they may have been reliable predictors of recidivism in 
our evolutionary past."); Katherine Harmon, Does Revenge Serve an Evolutionary 
Purpose?, SCI. AM., May 4, 2011, available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=revenge-evolution ("Michael 
McCullough ... explains that the impulse for revenge evolved as a simple cost-benefit 
equation .... "); Jaffe, supra note 15 ("The long history of vengeance in art suggests a 
basic instinct for retribution ingrained in the human spirit. ... [W]hy does it remain a 
favorite dish of the people? . . . [M]any psychological scientists have embraced an 
evolutionary explanation of revenge."); Mackie, supra note 15, at 8-9 (offering a 
''biological explanation for the tendency to feel nonmoral resentment of injuries and 
gratitude for benefits"); Murphy, supra note 23, at 95 n.9 (referring to "reciprocal 
hatred" as an "evolutionary strategy"). 
136. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Keynote Essay: A Modern Political Tribalism in 
Natural Resources Management, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. l, 5 (1990) ("Tribalism is a 
cohesive instinctive affiliation between people based on their recognition of and loyalty 
to common roots, a narrowed, non-official, racial, social and cultural allegiance that 
has evolved to have remarkable staying power and utility. Tribalism can be a precious 
cultural commodity, helping people survive in settings of extraordinary stress, 
deprivation, and complex antagonisms; it is a strategic survival mechanism in much of 
the Third World."). 
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Introduction and then again at the beginning of this Part, revenge is 
normally assumed to be bad. In the next two sections, I will offer two 
arguments that the desire for revenge in response to criminal 
wrongdoing is indeed justified and therefore can itself help to justify 
criminal punishment. 
B. The First Argument for the Justification Thesis 
Whether or not we admit it, most of us embrace revenge in our 
everyday lives. We only half-jokingly parrot the well-known sayings 
that "revenge is sweet" and a "dish best served cold."131 We often say 
things like "It serves him right!" and "She had it coming!" Bumper 
stickers proudly announce and warn: "I don't get mad. I get even."13s 
And we spend much of our everyday lives enjoying both fictional and 
non-fictional accounts of karma, payback, the tables being turned, 
settling scores, getting even, and unpleasant people getting theirs 
across widely different contexts. Examples include a dominating 
sports team being crushed; an unfaithful ex-lover being cheated on 
by his or her new spouse; a cocky politician losing big in an election; 
a wicked executive losing his wealth; an evil regime being toppled; a 
ruthless corporation going bankrupt; a bully getting pummeled; and 
wicked witches being crushed by flying houses and melting into 
lifeless puddles. Few, if any, of us object to these vengeful 
satisfactions. On the contrary, most of us regard them as delicious, 
refreshing, and highly entertaining; the stuff of great gossip, 
tabloids, literature, and movies; and therefore at least morally 
permissible, if not morally desirable.139 
Given our acceptance-or at least cheerful toleration-of revenge 
in everyday life, it is not exactly clear why some still believe that it is 
morally impermissible to consider vengeance as a motivation for 
criminal punishment. Why do they draw a line between permissible 
revenge and impermissible revenge at the criminal justice system? 
Why do they think that vengeful attitudes and actions are generally 
morally permissible outside the context of criminal punishment but 
morally impermissible within the context of the criminal justice 
system? Indeed, if vengefulness toward non-criminals is acceptable in 
everyday life, then vengefulness toward criminals should be all the 
more acceptable because criminals tend to cause the most serious 
harms. 
In response to the questions raised in the previous paragraph, 
the only two answers to these questions that come to mind do not 
137. But see FRENCH, supra note 26, at 69 (''Vengeance is warm, retribution is cold, 
poetic justice is frigid."). 
138. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 531. 
139. See BARTON, supra note 24, at xiv; FRENCH, supra note 26, at 3-64; Hershenov, 
supra note 14, at 90; Zaibert, supra note 23, at 84. 
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seem terribly convincing. The first possible answer is that while it is 
certainly morally permissible to enjoy bad people "getting theirs," it 
is not morally permissible to give bad people "theirs." In other words, 
while a vengeful attitude is morally permissible, vengefully 
motivated actions are not. There is, however, no good argument for 
this position. Morally speaking, if an attitude is justified, an action 
motivated by that attitude is equally justified; conversely, if an action 
is not justified, then the attitude is not justified either. It is not at all 
clear why we should make exceptions to this general rule for 
vengeance. 
A second possible reason for thinking that vengeance has no 
place in the criminal justice system is that vengeance is harmless 
only when it is "unofficial," that our vengeful delight at the 
misfortune that befalls bad but non-criminal individuals is morally 
permissible only because it does not cause any further harm. 
Conversely, vengeance does become harmful when we act on it in the 
criminal justice system. By unleashing our vengeance there, 
significant harm is being done, primarily to convicted criminals. 
In response to this second proposal, as I argued in Part IV.A 
above, revenge is harmful only when it is unjustified, misplaced, or 
excessive.140 This is not to say that the criminal justice system does 
not inflict unjustified, misplaced, or excessive vengeance. 
Unfortunately, it does. But these mistakes are still much more 
contained than they would be if private-or vigilante-justice were 
allowed or encouraged. Because the state is a more disinterested, less 
emotionally involved party than are victims, and because the state 
has appropriated from victims the role of punisher, criminals are 
generally punished in a more careful, fair, humane, and proportional 
manner than they would be if victims themselves were allowed to 
take matters into their own hands.141 
140. This point assumes that suffering does not constitute a harm if it is deserved. 
See Gabriel Seltzer Mendlow, Is Tort Law a Form of Institutionalized Revenge?, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 129, 130-32 (2011) (arguing that even though tort remedies impose 
substantial burdens by limiting "defendants' freedom of action and ... caus[ing] 
defendants to part with money and other things of value," they do not constitute 
harms because they are not setbacks to legitimate interests-that is, interests that the 
defendants have a right to maintain). 
141. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) ("The instinct for retribution 
is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of 
criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society 
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or 
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there 
are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.") 
(Stewart, J., concurring); BOONIN, supra note 11, at 153 ("One possible answer to this 
question [how punishment can be justified] is as follows: because the feeling of revenge 
is so widespread and so powerful, it is virtually inevitable that if the state does not 
punish an offender, someone else will .... Since the state is in a position to judge and 
mete out punishment impartially, while victims and their friends are more likely to act 
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C. The Second, Argument for the Justification Thesis 
Feeling angry, resentful, indignant, and therefore vengeful 
toward a blameworthy wrongdoer, especially a perpetrator of a 
harmful crime, is actually morally superior to not having these 
feelings because these feelings are ultimately rooted in sympathy for 
indiscriminately and disproportionately, it follows that the harms caused by the 
pursuit of revenge can be minimized by channeling this desire through the state 
rather than by letting it run wild on its own."); FLETCHER, supra note 12, at 417 
(referring to the "fashionable consequentialist argument that it is socially desirable to 
channel the hostile energies of society into the punishment of criminals; not to do so 
would supposedly risk the greater evil of private vendettas and blood feuds.") (citation 
omitted); HOLMES, supra note 89, at 40 ("If people would gratify the passion of revenge 
outside of the law, if the law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the 
craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution."); MOORE, supra 
note 11, at 152 ("[l]f we recognize the dangers retributive punishment presents for the 
expression of resentment, sadism, and so on, we have every reason to design our 
punishment institutions to minimize the opportunity for such feelings to be expressed . 
. . . Retributive punishment is dangerous for individual persons to carry out, 
dangerous to their virtue . . .. For those like myself who are not theists, [the biblical 
injunction that retribution be exacted] must be performed by the state, not God."); 
Murphy, supra note 27, at 3-4 ("Certain wrongdoers quite properly excite the 
resentment (anger, hatred) of all right-thinking people, and the criminal law is a 
civilized and efficient way in which such passions may be directed toward their proper 
objects, allowing victims to get legitimate revenge consistently with the maintenance 
of public order."); PINKER, supra note 29, at 538 ("The law may be an ass, but it is a 
disinterested ass, and it can weigh harms without the self-serving distortions of the 
perpetrator or the victim .... "); id. at 541 ("[T]he disinterested justice of a decent 
Leviathan induces citizens to curb their impulses for revenge before it spirals into a 
destructive cycle."); VON HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 52 ("Perhaps the restraint of 
vengeance is an important function of the criminal sanction, but this is another 
utilitarian claim: that there will be less social disruption if offenders are punished by 
the state rather than left to private retaliation.") (footnote omitted); Colby, supra note 
111, at 441 ("If we control revenge through the legal system-through the mechanism 
of judicially constrained punitive damages-we can ensure that it is achieved in a way 
that is consistent with, not defiant of, law and justice. We can ensure that the 
punishment fits the offense, that like cases are treated alike, and that the accused is 
treated fairly. In fact, allowing controlled revenge affirmatively serves the goal of 
justice. Given the powerful, instinctive human impulse for revenge, affording a legal 
outlet for revenge within the framework of justice helps to prevent victims from 
seeking revenge outside of the framework of justice.") (citation omitted); Rosebury, 
supra note 8, at 9-10, 15, 17 (summarizing arguments for the superior practicality and 
justice obtained by state punishment as opposed to private revenge); Zaibert, supra 
note 23, at 100 ("(W]hat is really bad about vigilantism is the taking of justice into 
one's own hands, since there are many good reasons not to do so .. . . The wrongness of 
vigilantism is that, for political reasons, it makes good sense to prevent people from 
taking justice into their own hands (even if people would mete out exactly just 
punishments) regarding some sorts of wrongs."). But see MOORE, supra note 11, at 89-
90 n.14 (arguing that prevention of vigilante justice is "not even a prima facie 
justifying reason for punishment."); Husak, Retribution, supra note 18, at 971-74 
(arguing that retributive justice can, in principle, be achieved without state 
involvement). 
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the victim and respect for her humanity.142 We are, as Moore 
suggests, "vicariously injured."143 We feel angry, resentful, indignant, 
and vengeful toward the criminal precisely because she harmed the 
victim, a fellow human being. At the very least, she committed a 
crime against her victim; this alone constitutes a moral harm. And 
through this criminal act, she also caused her victim fatal, physical, 
psychological, or economic harm. Again, if we have moral 
sentiments-namely, respect for the victim as a person, a human 
being whose rights, autonomy, and dignity were violated-we will 
react with anger, resentment, indignation, and vengeance.144 
Because these feelings have moral motivations behind them, they are 
moral reactions.145 It follows, then, that not to react vengefully-to 
react with, for example, indifference, amusement, immediate 
forgiveness, or even greater sympathy for the perpetrator than for 
the victim-is actually insulting and therefore immora[.146 
142. See Ristroph, supra note 18, at 1299-1300 ("[M]odern retributivists ... have 
argued . . . that the equality that punishment restores is really an equality of 
expressed dignities. In Jean Hampton's account, 'inherent in a criminal's action is the 
message that the victim is not worth enough for him to treat her better.' Consequently, 
retributive punishment 'uses the infliction of suffering to symbolize the subjugation of 
the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the victim. And the message 
carried in this subjugation is, 'What you did to her, she can do to you. So you're equal.' 
Both versions of egalitarian retributivism recounted here emphasize respect for 
persons. Punishment must be imposed to respect the dignity of the victim as well as 
the dignity of the wrongdoer.") (citations omitted). 
143. MOORE, supra note 11, at 141. 
144. See supra notes 23, 90, and 99 and accompanying text. 
145. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 89-90 ("The hatred felt by [victims of serious 
injustice] will typically have a righteous dimension-indicated by the fact that they ... 
are often willing to avow publicly, as appropriate and as nothing to be ashamed of, the 
true nature of their feelings and motives .... Even those who would argue that such 
[sentiments] should not influence a judge must surely admit that [they] are in some 
sense understandable, natural, and appropriate to the harm done to those people-
that they involve something which is ... at least more worthy ... of our attention and 
respect."). 
146. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 141 ("While it has a saintly ring to it to turn the 
other cheek so long as it is one's own cheek that has just been slapped, is it virtuous to 
feel nothing stronger than sympathy for the suffering of others at the hands of 
wrongdoers? Where is that compassionate concern for others that is outraged because 
another person has been so unnecessarily caused such suffering?"); id. at 144 ("If it is 
morally odious not to care about others ... then must it not be virtuous to feel such 
concern? And if the answer to this question is 'yes', as I think it plainly is, then must it 
not also be virtuous to feel negatively in some way towards flagrant moral violations 
that hurt others, virtuous to allow such negative feelings to cause retributive 
judgments?"); id. at 164 ("[I]t evinces both a lack of empathetic identification with 
others who are victims, and a lack of attachment to morality, to be indifferent to 
culpable wrongdoing by another .... [T]here is no virtue in turning someone else's 
cheek when they have been slapped. Violations of others' moral rights should make us 
angry at those who flout that morality .... "); Murphy, supra note 23, at 92 ("I would 
have found it indecently insensitive and presumptuous had anyone charged [rape 
victims] with the vice of failing to forgive and love their enemies .... had, in short, 
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The following hypothetical helps to demonstrate this point.147 It 
is a hypothetical of the third kind mentioned in the Introduction: 
non-punishment with good consequences.14s Suppose that 
pharmacologists have synthesized a drug that cures pedophilia. A 
convicted pedophile need take only one small, tasteless twenty-
milligram tablet of "NoPed" with water to immediately and 
permanently lose all of his illicit sexual desires. Moreover, in 
addition to being 100% effective, NoPed has proven to be 100% safe. 
Nobody who takes it will suffer any temporary or permanent side-
effects. For this reason, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) has 
approved of NoPed as a treatment for convicted pedophiles. 
Suppose further that twenty-five-year-old "Pedo'' has just been 
convicted of soliciting and engaging in sexual acts with a nine-year-
old girl ("Victim"). Should Pedo's sentence be a forced administration 
of NoPed, after which he will be allowed to return to the community? 
Or even if he takes NoPed, should he still have to spend at least a 
few years in jail to "pay" for his crimes? 
The proponent of the Justification Thesis-call her the Avenger 
-will clearly opt for the latter.149 She regards Pedo's moral debt as 
anyone attempted to add to their already considerable burdens by making them feel 
guilty or ashamed over a reaction that was, given what was done to them, natural, 
fitting, and proper."); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions 
of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 689 (1989) ("In the context of 
punishment, which focuses on responsible acts of disrespect for others, moral caring 
means being angry at culpable acts of disrespect. I will refer to this emotion as moral 
outrage. Moral outrage represents caring for the morality of persons by denouncing 
their demonstrated evil-their responsible disrespect for others. We should feel 
angered by the deliberate choice of an offender to commit an act of severe disrespect. 
Such a feeling demonstrates our commitment to preserving moral order and to society 
which promotes respect and regard for others.") (citations omitted). 
147. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 97-103 (using similar thought-experiments to 
show that (a) even if conditions were such that criminal punishment yielded no good 
consequences, most of us still want perpetrators of sufficiently serious crimes to be 
punished and therefore (b) most of us support criminal punishment primarily to 
deliver just deserts, not to deliver good consequences). 
148. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
149. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 538-39 ("Even if we were certain that the 
perpetrator of a heinous crime would never offend again, nor set an example for 
anyone else, most people would feel that 'justice must be done' and that he should 
incur some harm to balance the harm he has caused."); Dolinko, supra note 11, at 406-
07 ("[S]uppose that some nonpunitive technique is developed that costs much less than 
traditional punishment (both in money and in suffering) yet is more effective in 
reducing crime levels. . . . A consequentialist would have to favor replacing 
punishment by this new system, provided its advantages are great enough. But such a 
shift would do violence to the sentiments of the vast majority of people, who believe 
that justice demands that the perpetrators of brutal, heinous crimes be made to suffer 
for what they have done.") (citations omitted); Hershenov, supra note 14, at 84 ("If the 
motivation were just deterrence and/or reform, then, if for some reason this could be 
achieved without offsetting the psychological benefits the criminal received from his 
conduct, the interest in erasing such wrongful gains, or in their absence, just imposing 
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twofold: not only (a) the physical and psychological harm that Pedo 
inflicted upon Victim, but also (b) Pedo's malevolent attitude toward 
both Victim and the law. Regarding (a), Pedo caused injury to 
Victim's supremely valued interests, her physical well-being and 
emotional well-being. Regarding (b), Pedo also caused moral harm; 
he showed contempt and indifference not only for Victim but also for 
the law. By treating Victim, a young girl, as a mere means to his own 
end, sexual pleasure, he made it clear that he simply did not care 
what society thinks is wrong and did not respect Victim as a human 
being with a right against sexual violation.150 According to the 
Avenger, we simply should not tolerate this kind of defiance. On the 
contrary, we should send our own counteractive message right back 
at Pedo. We should convey to Pedo, with righteous anger, that 
whatever he may think, society values Victim and the law and 
laments the fact that Pedo broke it, the harm that Pedo thereby 
caused Victim, and the cavalier, indifferent, and selfish attitude with 
which Pedo wreaked all this havoc. The Avenger further maintains 
that the only way in which society can convey this message with 
sufficient force is through criminal punishment-in this case, 
imprisonment. It is at this point that the Motivation Thesis 
(payback) and expressivism (teaching him a lesson) come together.151 
burdens on the criminal. should vanish. But such interests are unlikely to 
disappear."); see also Kennedy Ryan, Father Beats Man Unconscious After Catching 
Him Molesting Son: Police, KTLA 5 News, July 18, 2014, available at 
http://ktla.com/2014/07/18/davtona-beach-father-beats-man-unconscious-after-
catching-him-molesting-son-police/ ("No charges were filed Friday against a Daytona 
Beach father who beat a man unconscious after allegedly catching him in the act of 
sexually assaulting his 11-year-old son .... 'Dad was acting like a dad. I don't see 
anything we should charge the dad with,' Daytona Beach police Chief Mike Chitwood 
told The News Journal."'). 
150. See JOAN MCGREGOR, Is IT RAPE? ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING 
WOMEN'S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 230-31 (2005) ("Rapes express very clearly the message 
of the inferiority of women. The rapist ... sends the message that this woman is for 
his enjoyment, an object to be used for his pleasure. His actions express her inferiority 
to him .... For him, her wishes and desires are irrelevant. He is superior to her, his 
desires matter and hers do not, making her an object rather than an equal person. 
Sending this message is the expressive moral injury of rape. The message of 
inferiority, of what women are for, is received by all women, not merely by the woman 
who experiences the rape .... The rapist aims, whether consciously or not, to establish 
his mastery of men over women .... Rape is therefore a moral injury to women as a 
group."); see also Fletcher, supra note 24, at 110 ("Blackmail, theft, embezzlement, all 
leave a wake of dominance and subordination. Rape victims have good reason to fear 
that the rapist will return, particularly if the rape occurred at home or he otherwise 
knows her address. Burglars and robbers pose the same threat. . . . It would be 
difficult to maintain that all crimes are characterized by this feature of dominance. 
The most we can say is that this relationship of power lies at the core of the criminal 
law. It is characteristic of the system as a whole."). 
151. See FRENCH, supra note 26, at 84 ("Revenge delivers a message, or, rather, 
revenge is a message ... Some might say that the message is an educative one ... . 
Alternatively, it might be supposed that the message is one of deterrence .... Yet 
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In short, then, the Avenger will (correctly) rebel against the 
prospect of Pedo's victimizing Victim and then suffering no more 
than a forced administration of a tasteless pill for his crime. Even if 
we could be certain that all convicted pedophiles would be 
immediately cured by NoPed, the Avenger will maintain that they 
would still need to suffer proportional criminal punishment for their 
prior pedophiliac acts. Suffering criminal punishment is the only way 
in which they could pay the moral debt that they incurred when (a) 
they failed to notify the state that they are a danger to children, (b) 
thereby failed to take the best preventative measure (i.e., NoPed), 
and (c) ended up, for their own pleasure, selfishly and callously 
sexually abusing their young victims. 
Doug Husak suggests that "it is notoriously difficult to explain 
why [our natural psychological reaction of disapproval or censure] is 
widely regarded as [a] fitting'' response to criminal behavior.1s2 But if 
my account above is correct, then we do have an explanation of this 
psychological reaction. We find disapproval to be a fitting response to 
criminal behavior because (a) criminal behavior either harms or 
threatens to harm what we value most and (b) the offender thereby 
exhibits contempt and disregard for our supremely valued 
interests.153 
V. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
In this Part, I will anticipate and reply to three objections-the 
first two against the Motivation Thesis and the third against the 
Justification Thesis. 
another possibility is that the message is one of reform ... "); id. at 85 ("The act of 
vengeance is an expression of the effect of morality in and for itself. Morality has been 
mocked by the offender, but, through the avenger's agency, morality will yet have a 
very significant effect on the offender's life. It may well end it."); id. at 86 ("Morality 
qua morality is transmitted in the message of vengeance. The avenger is the agent of 
an otherwise impotent morality, which is enabled, through the avenger, to 
communicate a significant impact in the life of the offender .... "); Hampton, supra 
note 15, at 13 ("The retributive punisher uses the infliction of suffering to symbolize 
the subjugation of the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the 
victim. And the message carried in this subjugation is 'What you did to her, she can do 
to you. So you're equal.' The one who acted as if he were the lord of the victim is 
humbled to show that he isn't lord after all. In this way, the demeaning message 
implicit in his action is denied."). The consequentialist is also likely to opt for 
imprisonment because Pedo's avoiding imprisonment would likely encourage many 
not-yet-cured pedophiles to take as many "free bites of the apple" as they could before 
getting caught. 
152. Husak, Why Punish, supra note 18, at 456. Eight years later, Husak seemed to 
have changed his attitude and regarded this "fittingness" as obvious or transparent 
when he suggested that "there is something fitting or appropriate about reacting with 
disapproval at the sight of cruelty" and that "the fit we intuit does not really obtain 
between crime and punishment, but rather between crime (as culpable wrongdoing) 
and suffering (or deprivation or hardship)." Husak, Retribution, supra note 18, at 973. 
153. See MCGREGOR, supra note 150, at 226-27; Hershenov, supra note 14, at 87. 
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A. Objection 1: Criminal Punishment Is Not Motivated by 
Collective Vengeance 
According to Objection 1, I have contradicted myself. On the one 
hand, I argued in Part III.E that many members of society do not feel 
much, if any, emotional reaction to particular crimes or criminals. I 
said, "Even the most horrific crimes rarely move most of us because 
we do not know the victim, and we have (unfortunately) heard about 
too many other anonymous victims to invest our emotions in any 
particular one of them." On the other hand, I also argued in Part 
III.C that one of the two primary goals of the criminal justice system, 
to give criminals what they deserve, is motivated by an intense, 
deeply rooted desire for revenge against criminals. These two 
propositions appear to be inconsistent. 
Reply to Objection 1: They are not inconsistent. To see how they are 
consistent, we need to make two distinctions. First, we need to 
distinguish between individuals' reactions to particular instances of 
criminal wrongdoing and individuals' attitudes towards criminal 
wrongdoing generally. A person may feel vengeful toward criminals 
generally without feeling vengeful toward any particular criminal. 
Put enough of such people together, and we end up with an 
institution, criminal punishment, that is motivated by collective, 
anti-criminal vengeance in a society where most of the individuals do 
not necessarily feel terribly vengeful toward most of the criminals 
whom they read or hear about.154 The institution of criminal 
punishment, then, symbolizes or represents the collective vengeance 
just noted as well as the actual, personal vengeance felt by victims, 
victims' families, and those members of society who do wish to see 
this or that particular criminal punished. 
Second, we need to distinguish between active and dormant 
vengeance. Most of us do not have much, if any, emotional reaction to 
the crimes that we read or hear about because, as suggested above, 
we do not know the victims, no less the perpetrators. Just as 
importantly, we also believe that the individuals who committed 
these offenses are more or less being taken care of by the police, 
prosecutors, courts, and prisons. But if the criminal justice system 
were somehow to break down and we could no longer be as confident 
that criminals were being successfully pursued, caught, tried, 
convicted, and punished, many more people would likely experience 
much greater fear, anger, and-yes- vengeance. 
Consider, for example, neighborhoods in which the police have 
proven either unhelpful or ineffective at reducing such crimes as 
154. See Murphy, supra note 27, at 2. 
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drug distribution and gang violence. The majority of law-abiding 
citizens in these neighborhoods do not generally regard this criminal 
activity with indifference. On the contrary, they feel considerable 
anger-both at the criminals for menacing them and at the police for 
failing to remove this menace.155 Indeed, once this frustration and 
anger reaches a critical mass, many of these neighborhoods "band 
together," fight back, and do their best to remove the menace 
themselves, without the assistance of law enforcement.156 
As the very phrase "fighting back" suggests, these efforts at 
restoring public order are fueled primarily by anger and vengeance. 
This anger and vengeance would not be felt in the first place if the 
law were already being effectively enforced. It follows that this 
collective anger and vengeance is already there, silently motivating 
the institution of criminal punishment. It is just not consciously felt 
by many individuals until this institution fails to operate as usual. 
Then our "true colors" come out. 
B. Objection 2: Vengeance Is Too Harsh and Hypocritical 
Jeffrie Murphy was perhaps the most prominent and outspoken 
advocate not only for retributivism but also for the Motivation 
Thesis.157 In 2006, however, Professor Murphy softened his position 
and referred to himself as a "reluctant retributivist."15s Murphy is 
now reluctant, as opposed to enthusiastic, about retributivism 
because he agrees with Nietzsche that retributivism without 
reluctance-an unhesitant, unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous 
desire to judge and punish-tends to reflect an unhealthy soul; a soul 
that judges others too harshly and itself too lightly.159 The unhealthy 
soul does these things because it fails to take into account 
situationism: the theory that people's behavior is generated largely 
by internal and external factors outside their control.loo 
So, on the one hand, the unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous 
avenger judges the wrongdoer too harshly because she ignores the 
155. See Kim Remesch, Drugs and Crime in Your Neighborhood? Fight Back, 
YAHOO (March 14, 2009), http://voices.yahoo.com/drugs-crime-neighborhood-fight-
back-2879899.html?cat=l 7[1/18/2014. 
156. See id.; see also Olena Heu, Mililani Residents Fight Back After Rash of 
Burglaries (FOX NEWS broadcast Apr. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.cli psyndica te .com/video/play /197 4606/mililani_residents_figh t_back_after _ 
rash_of_neighborhood_burglaries; 
157. See generally Murphy, supra note 23; Murphy, supra note 27. 
158. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Mora/ism and Retribution Revisited, PROCEEDINGS & 
ADDRESSES AM. PHILOSOPHICAL AsS'N, Nov. 2006, at 45, 57. 
159. Id. at 60. 
160. For some comprehensive defenses of situationism, see generally PHILIP 
ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING How GOOD PEOPLE TuRN EVIL 
(2007); Dripps, supra note 18; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational 
Character: A Critical' Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004). 
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factors outside the wrongdoer's control-the bad luck-that helped 
lead to her wrongdoing. Because bad luck tends to mitigate or excuse, 
ignoring this element of bad luck in all wrongdoing is not only 
misguided and uncharitable; it is cruel.161 On the other hand, the 
unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous avenger judges herself too 
lightly insofar as she fails to take into account her own good luck-
the fortuitous circumstance that all of the factors outside her control 
did not lead her to commit the very same bad acts that she now so 
eagerly wishes to condemn and punish.162 
Rather than inferring from situationism that criminal 
punishment is no longer justified, we need to strike a healthy balance 
between them. And this is exactly what Murphy tries to do when he 
declares himself a reluctant retributivist.163 He remains a 
retributivist; to this extent, he still endorses blaming and punishing 
criminals for their criminal acts.164 But he is reluctant to fully 
endorse this position because he recognizes that bad luck plays a role 
in every criminal act. Murphy refers to these two positions-
retributivism and reluctance-as the "Two Faces of Retribution."165 
Given his reluctance, why does Murphy even remain a 
retributivist to begin with? Why doesn't he abandon it altogether? 
According to Murphy, while we must acknowledge the bad luck that 
lies behind every crime, we must still blame and punish the criminal 
for this crime because bad luck does not completely explain it.166 
When it does, the defendant is fully excused; too much bad luck is 
arguably what all the traditionally recognized criminal law excuses-
insanity, infancy, hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, automatism, 
duress, necessity, mistake of fact, mistake of law, and entrapment-
attempt to capture. To the extent that bad luck does not play a part 
in the explanation of a given criminal's behavior-that is, to the 
extent that this individual knowingly and voluntarily broke the law 
without a good excuse or justification-she still does deserve to be 
convicted, condemned, and punished.167 
Reply to Objection 2: In a nutshell, Murphy's point is that while we 
should indeed continue to judge, blame, and punish, we should 
always keep in mind when we do this judging, blaming, and 
161. See Murphy, supra note 159, at 59. The notion that it is unfair to punish a 
person for bad luck-something not in the person's control-is a fundamental axiom in 
philosophy and criminal law. For a comprehensive list of books and articles discussing 
this axiom, see Levy, supra note 8, at 267-68 n.7. 
162. See Murphy, supra note 159, at 55-56. 
163. See id. at 57. 
164. See id. at 54, 56. 
165. See id. at 57. 
166. See id. at 57. 
167. Id. 
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punishing that there but for the grace of luck go I. I fully agree with 
this situationist point. But situationism still leaves as much room for 
vengeance as it leaves for just blame and just punishment. In fact, it 
is the same room. Yes, the criminal suffered from some bad luck. But 
so did the victim-at the hands of the criminal. So to the extent that 
the criminal does indeed deserve blame and punishment for 
knowingly and voluntarily hurting the victim-again, a point that 
Murphy still endorses, however reluctantly-the criminal equally 
deserves the victim's and society's wrath and vengeful desire for 
retribution. 
C. Objection 3: Forgiveness Is Superior to Revenge 
According to Objection 3, the Justification Thesis is both false 
and short-sighted. It is false because forgiveness is morally superior 
to vengeance. And it is short-sighted because it prioritizes the most 
effective short-term method for discharging the uncomfortable 
feelings of anger, resentment, indignation, and humiliation over the 
most effective long-term method for achieving this same satisfaction: 
patiently waiting until the "rotten" feelings pass, at which point we 
may feel more inclined to forgive the criminal for her transgressions, 
to accept what she did without any accompanying feelings of anger or 
a desire for retaliation. This long-term approach is preferable for the 
same reason that long-term planning is generally preferable, all else 
being equal, to short-term planning: it generates greater overall 
utility.ms As compared with vengeance, forgiveness is psychologically 
healthier, and it does a much better job of promoting 
reconciliation.169 
Reply to Objection 3: Objection 3 runs into several problems. First, it 
simply assumes that the opposite of forgiveness-vengeance-is 
morally wrong. But, as I suggested in Part IV, this assumption is 
false. So the proponent of forgiveness over vengeance in the context 
of criminal law is not entitled to it. 
Second, because forgiveness often takes a very long time, 
because most human beings are not that patient, and because many 
think that some crimes are simply unforgivable, they tend to give up 
earlier in the process and opt for the short-term method: vengeance, 
168. See Ken Levy, On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle, 90 
PAC. PHIL. Q. 267, 277 (2009) ("[R]ule-utilitarianism produces greater overall utility 
than act-utilitarianism. Pursuing utility-maximizing courses of action produces 
greater overall utility in the long term than pursuing utility-maximizing actions, even 
if such pursuit sometimes requires performing actions that are likely to produce less 
utility than alternative actions.") (footnote omitted). 
169. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEAi.'lCE AND FORGIVENESS 19-20 (1998). 
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usually in the form of criminal punishment.110 As a result, a criminal 
justice system that generally forgave criminals rather than 
punishing them would seriously frustrate the (vengeful) public. It 
would, in most cases, fail to achieve the moral, social, and emotional 
equilibrium that only criminal punishment can yield.111 
Third, especially for more serious crimes, only the victim, not the 
state, is in a position to forgive the wrongdoer. It would be arrogant 
and presumptuous for the state to appropriate this prerogative from 
the victim, the one who suffered the brunt of the harm.112 
Fourth, the criminal justice system does not hold us to an 
impossibly high standard. The criminal justice system does not 
require us all to be saints. If it did, then most of us would be in jail. 
Instead, the criminal justice system does just the opposite. It 
establishes a floor, not a ceiling. It tells individuals within its 
jurisdiction the minimum that they cannot drop below, not a 
threshold that they must rise above. We are all free to be jerks; we 
just cannot be supreme jerks. That is, we are all free to do such 
morally wrong things as lie to friends, send angry emails, and "flip 
the bird" at other drivers. We will not go to jail for these acts even 
though they fall below a proper standard of virtue. But we will go to 
jail if we injure or attempt to injure others in much more serious 
ways-ways that fall below a minimum standard of care that we owe 
everybody else. So even if forgiveness were indeed the most virtuous 
response to all transgressions, the criminal justice system simply 
does not endorse or reflect this supposed moral truth. It does not 
forgive or recommend forgiving people for committing acts that fall 
below the minimum standard of care.173 
Fifth, a policy of forgiveness would lead to a dramatic increase in 
crime because it would signal to all would-be criminals that they 
could now commit crimes with impunity.174 For this reason alone, it 
170. Id. at 16-19 (discussing reasons to resist forgiveness). 
171. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, ET AL., RAMPAGE: THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF SCHOOL 
SHOOTINGS 179-81 (2004) (providing evidence that many people, including devout 
Christians, prefer to blame and punish rather than forgive school shooters); 
Hershenov, supra note 14, at 88-89 ("Even if the victim is exceptionally forgiving and 
seeks to drop the charge without a debt payment, the criminal cannot go free. First, 
this much too quick offering of forgiveness is really such a corrupt form of forgiveness . 
. . Perhaps a person who forgives too quickly has such low self-esteem he does not 
believe it was that bad for him to be treated as he was. Or the corrupt motivation for 
prematurely granting forgiveness is the victim really wants to forget rather than 
forgive . ... Second ... all of society ... have the right to relish [the criminal's] justified 
suffering even if his direct victim immediately 'forgives' him."). 
172. See LEWIS B. SMEDES, THE ART OF FORGIVING 39 (1996); Meyer, supra note 
117, at 1524-25; Dennis Prager, Editorial, The Sin of Forgiveness, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 
1997, at A22. 
173. See Lerman, supra note 27, at 1667-70. 
174. See Prager, supra note 172. 
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would be very foolish for the state to replace criminal punishment 
with a policy of forgiveness. 
Still, despite the five arguments above, forgiveness may be 
advisable for the state with respect to some perpetrators in some 
situations. For example, forgiveness may be appropriate when either 
the crime is relatively trivial175 or the criminal had an 
understandable reason for committing it.116 
Martha Minow also argues that forgiveness, or at least attitudes 
and practices "between vengeance and forgiveness," might be 
appropriate for victims of mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.111 She offers three reasons: (a) 
there may be so many perpetrators that the post-atrocity transitional 
state simply lacks the resources to try and punish all of them; (b) 
trials, which tend to last years, may perpetuate, if not exacerbate, 
societal divisions, thereby prevent the state from "healing," and 
possibly even lead to renewed hostilities; and (c) victims and their 
families will likely be psychologically healthier if they can eventually 
bring themselves to forgive rather than let themselves be consumed 
by insatiable hatred and a desire for retaliation that may just never 
be realized.11s 
To be clear, this qualified defense of forgiveness in certain, very 
specific situations should not be confused with a defense of mercy.119 
Forgiveness and mercy are distinct in at least two respects. First, 
175. See Husak, supra note 16, at 330. 
176. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 335-36 (1983). 
177. See MINOW, supra note 169, at 21-24. 
178. See id. at 105-06 ("[Hatred] . .. could, in some cases, become one's life instead 
of being a part of one's life . .. . [F]eelings of hatred can, in many cases, consume one's 
entire self. Thus it might be seen a blessing-perhaps even divine grace-to have the 
burden of hatred lifted from one's mind. For this reason forgiveness can bless the 
forgiver as much as or more than it blesses the one forgiven.") (citations omitted); 
Steiker, supra note 47, at 29 ("[O]ne of the goals of the restorative justice movement is 
to move beyond the cycles of violence that communities and whole nations face ... . 
'[Mercy] brings into the world those sorts of actions that break the cycle of revenge and 
retribution into which actors and even whole communities can so easily fall. It 
promotes harmony in the community, reconciliation, and flourishing."') (quoting 
Andrew Brien, Mercy Within Legal Justice, Soc. THEORY & PR.Ac. 24, 106 (1998). But 
see Prager, supra note 1 73 ("Some people have a more sophisticated defense of the 
forgive-everyone-everything doctrine: Victims should be encouraged to forgive all evil 
done to them because doing so is psychologically healthy. It brings 'closure.' This ... is 
selfishness masquerading as idealism-the argument being, 'Though you do not 
deserve to be forgiven, and though you may not even be sorry, I forgive you because I 
want to feel better."). 
179. But see Steiker, supra note 47, at 25 ("Under the skeptical view [of mercy], 
mercy has no place in criminal justice because justice is served only when offenders 
are punished in accordance with their desert. But this view does not attend to the 
possibilities of forgiveness by victims or their reconciliation with offenders .... "). 
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forgiveness is an attitude, mercy an act.180 Second, those who 
advocate a greater role for mercy in the criminal justice system are 
not advocating that we increasingly forgive criminals. They still 
support continuing to prosecute and punish criminals. They argue 
only that this punishment is often excessive; that in our inherently 
imprecise calculations of just deserts, we too often ignore or discount 
the complex social and psychological conditions that cause many 
people to violate the law.181 So to make punishments better fit the 
crimes, judges, jurors, and legislators should develop a greater 
awareness of, and concern for, these mitigating conditions and 
incorporate this awareness into the sentences that they help to 
impose.182 
180. See Markel, supra note 18, atl440. 
181. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also SUSAN GRIFFIN, A CHORUS 
OF STONES: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF WAR 115-66 (1992); ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN 
GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE (1984); 
Denny LeBoeuf, Joel in the Wormhole, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1059 passim (2009); Gary 
Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 
1987), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 119, 134-37 (John Martin 
Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993); see also Mythri A. Jayaraman, Rotten Social 
Background Revisited, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 327 (2002) (explicating the Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), that capital defendants have a 
constitutional right to provide evidence of "rotten social background" as a mitigating 
factor at the sentencing phase of their trials). But see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE 
ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
3-4 7 (1994) (arguing that the criminal justice system should not recognize past abuse 
as an excuse for criminal wrongdoing); Peter Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: 
Is There One?, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL 'y 703 passim (1996) (arguing that while the 
"abuse excuse" is "indefensible," it is rarely used and even more rarely successful); 
Richard Delgado, ''Rotten Social Background':· Should the Criminal Law Recognize a 
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985); Alan M. 
Dershowitz, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System?, 3 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 775 passim (2000) (arguing that the "abuse excuse," in particular 
battered woman syndrome, is weak both morally and empirically); George Vuoso, 
Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 passim (1987) (arguing 
that an "an adverse early social background" can at best mitigate, but not excuse, 
defendants for their criminal acts); Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the 
Criminal Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 475 (2006) (arguing that if we cannot 
allow abuse to excuse adults for their wrongdoing, we can no more allow it to excuse 
children for their wrongdoing). 
182. See Steiker, supra note 47, at 30-31; Carol S. Steiker, Passing the Buck on 
Mercy, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at B07; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Reply, in 
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 181, 183 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey, & 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (citing, with qualified approval, the following 
passage from NIETZSCHE, supra note 14, at 72: "As its power increases, a community 
ceases to take the individual's transgressions so seriously .... It is not unthinkable 
that a society one day might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow 
itself the noblest luxury possible to it-letting those who harm it go unpunished. 
'What are my parasites to me?' it might say. 'May they live and prosper: I am strong 
enough for that!"'). But see Markel, supra note 18, at 1454 (arguing that "acts of mercy 
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While some have argued that this "pro-mercy" approach is 
incompatible with retributivism,183 the fact that the pro-mercy camp 
still advocates criminal punishment-indeed, fairer criminal 
punishment-suggests that this approach is actually perfectly 
compatible with retributivism.184 More importantly for my purposes, 
it is also perfectly compatible with the Justification Thesis. One can 
be for both mercy and vengeance. Mercy is designed merely to 
prevent the vengeance from spinning out of control, not necessarily to 
extinguish it altogether. 
VI. THE THIRD REASON WITT RETRIBUTIVISM NEEDS 
CONSEQUENTIALISM: HARMLESS CRIMES 
So far, I have argued that (a) society's vengeful attitude toward 
criminals who cause serious harm-fatal, physical, psychological, or 
economic-largely explains why we wish to punish criminals (the 
Motivation Thesis); and (b) because vengeance is an appropriate, 
moral reaction to criminals' injuring people's supremely valued 
interests, this sentiment also helps to justify criminal punishment 
(the Justification Thesis). But there are three reasons to think that 
retributivism cannot by itself fully explain and justify criminal 
punishment. The first two reasons-both consequentialist-were 
already given in Part III. Both explain why consequentialism does a 
better job than retributivism of accounting for the fact that the state 
insists on inflicting negative desert but not on guaranteeing positive 
desert. Once again, the first reason is practicability and the second 
reason is vengeance, the need to channel our vengeful impulses 
through criminal punishment in order to achieve moral, social, and 
emotional equilibrium. In this Part, I will offer yet a third reason for 
supplementing retributivism with consequentialism: only 
consequentialism, not retributivism, can explain-and therefore 
justify-our punishing certain harmless crimes. 
Harmless crimes-or, more precisely, acts that do not necessarily 
cause harm but are still criminalized-fall into two categories: (a) 
acts that substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm; and 
(b) acts that do not substantially increase the risk of causing serious 
harm. Examples of (a) include the inchoate crimes of attempt, 
conspiracy, solicitation, and reckless endangerment. Examples of (b) 
include drug possession, resisting arrest, and perjury. 
When I say that only consequentialism, not retributivism, can 
ultimately undermine each of the principles undergirding [retributivism]-moral 
accountability, equal liberty under law, and democratic self-defense"). 
183. See, e.g., Markel, supra note 18, at 1453-64; see also Husak, Why Punish, supra 
note 18, at 450 (arguing that Herbert Morris is committed to the (bizarre) position that 
because criminal punishment is a right (see Morris, supra note 58, at 475-76), 
criminals should themselves be opposed to mercy). 
184. See Steiker, supra note 47, at 25-27. 
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explain and justify punishment of harmless crimes, I am referring 
not to (a)-type (risky) harmless crimes but to (b)-type (non-risky) 
harmless crimes. There are two reasons that retributivism does help 
to explain and justify punishment of risky harmless crimes. First, 
once again, risky harmless crimes substantially increase the risk of 
causing serious harm, and this increase of risk may itself be 
considered a harm for which the wrongdoer deserves punishment.185 
Second, inchoate crimes often cause psychological harm even when 
the object of the inchoate crime is not achieved. For example, while 
the target of an attempted murder might feel relieved that she is still 
alive, she may very well feel very distressed that she came so close to 
being killed. Likewise, a child who has been solicited for sexual 
activity might be traumatized merely by the solicitation even though 
no sexual activity actually ensued. 
Non-risky harmless crimes, on the other hand, do present a real 
challenge to retributivism.186 Consider, for example, drug possession. 
Suppose Cokie is carrying ten ounces of cocaine in the passenger seat 
while driving thirty miles per hour over the speed limit. The police 
pull Cokie over for speeding. After Cokie rolls down her window, they 
notice the bag of cocaine. They ask her what it is, she answers 
honestly, and they arrest her for cocaine possession. Several weeks 
later, after a brief trial, the jury convicts Cokie of cocaine possession. 
This seems to be the correct result-at least the legally correct result. 
Cokie should be punished because she culpably committed the crime 
of cocaine possession. 
Once again, retributivism says that the desire to give a criminal 
her just deserts motivates criminal punishment. Given this, it seems, 
retributivism cannot explain why Cokie should be punished. A desire 
to give Cokie her just deserts is not the motivation for punishing her. 
Cokie's "act" of possessing cocaine does not motivate punishment in 
the same way that, say, murder or rape does; it does not "scream out" 
for punishment. More generally, it is not because of anything to do 
with just deserts that we have laws criminalizing the possession of 
drugs. There is nothing intrinsically wrongful-and therefore 
intrinsically deserving of criminal punishment-about possessing 
any drug.187 
Instead, what is really motivating Cokie's criminal punishment 
is not the retributivist goal of giving her what she deserves but 
185. See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 1000 (2003); 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1651 
(2002). 
186. See Husak, Retribution, supra note 18, at 966-70, 985. 
187. See DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 64-68 (1992) (arguing against the 
notion that drug use should be criminalized because it is immoral); von Hirsch, supra 
note 14, at 116 ("Criminal prohibitions of today have wide scope ... and include 
conduct that seems in no plausible way blameworthy."). 
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rather the consequentialist goal of minimizing the risk of certain 
harms. There are laws prohibiting possession of cocaine because they 
are thought to contribute toward an overall good consequence-
namely, minimization of the dangers of cocaine use. Use of cocaine is 
dangerous because it can lead to, among other things, anxiety, 
headache, high blood pressure, sinusitis, severe depression, violent 
behavior, loss of consciousness, tremors, hyperthermia, kidney 
failure, stroke, bleeding of the brain, heart attack, seizure, suicide, 
and sudden cardiac death.188 So the state has a significant and 
compelling interest in deterring cocaine use and therefore any and all 
activities that are necessary for, or contribute to, its usage. And one 
such activity (or act) is possession. 
Still, in response to this objection against retributivism, I argue 
that retributivism still can help, at least to some extent, to explain 
and justify criminal punishment for non-risky harmless crimes like 
cocaine possession. There are at least two different ways in which it 
can help to provide this explanation and justification. First, recall 
from Part II.B that weak retributivism is the theory that just 
punishment requires that the person being punished both committed 
wrongdoing and is being punished for this wrongdoing. 
Responsibility is a necessary condition of all just criminal 
punishment189 even if it-or the desire to hold somebody 
responsible-is not the driving motivation for certain kinds of 
criminal punishment. By weak retributivism, then, Cokie deserves 
punishment. It is not merely that she wanted to possess cocaine or 
fantasized about it. Sh~ actually carried through on this desire, this 
carrying-through violated a criminal law, and she is criminally 
responsible for this act. Ex hypothesi, she knowingly and willingly 
acquired cocaine, omitted to dispose of it, and does not have any good 
excuses or justifications for this acquisition and omission. 
Second, in addition to weak retributivism, there is what is called 
"soft" or "limiting" retributivism and sometimes "side-constrained 
consequentialism."190 This version of retributivism suggests that (a) 
criminal punishment is justified primarily by consequentialism (the 
benefits that it yields such as specific deterrence and general 
deterrence) and (b) retributivism plays only a secondary role, which 
is to dictate an upper limit on the amount of punishment that may be 
inflicted for any given crime. Consequentialists who adopt this 
188. See JAN GARAVAGLIA, How NOT TO DIE: SURPRISING LESSONS ON LMNG 
LONGER, SAFER, AND HEALTHIER 147 (2008). 
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
190. See DUFF, supra note 14, at 11; MOORE, supra note 11, at 93; Ristroph, supra 
note 18, at 1301-03. But see Steiker, supra note 47, at 27 ("The idea of retributivism as 
an outer limit on punishment fails to tell us how to choose punishments up to that 
limit, and the idea of retributivism as setting a range of punishments likewise fails to 
guide us in choosing among them."). 
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version of retributivism are assuming three things: (a) the 
proportionality principle (the punishment should fit the crime or at 
least not be grossly unfitting), (b) pure consequentialism does not 
entail proportionality,191 and (c) retributivism is therefore necessary 
to make sure that the proportionality principle is observed. 
As I argued in Part II.B.2, however, (b) seems false. Once again, 
there is at least one good consequentialist reason for proportionality: 
it contributes to more effective enforcement of, and respect for, the 
law. And if, as I suggested in the Introduction, expressivism is at 
least partly consequentialist, then there is yet another partly 
consequentialist reason for proportionality: to communicate both to 
the criminal and to the community just how bad her crime was. 
Therefore (c) is false as well. So the fact that vengeance plays no role 
in motivating (or justifying) criminal punishment for non-risky 
harmless crimes does not mean that proportionality does not apply in 
this context. It still does-which just goes to show that the 
proportionality principle does not entail the Motivation Thesis, no 
less the Justification Thesis.192 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper confronts an age-old question: why do we punish? 
And there are some age-old answers-the two primary ones being to 
give criminals their just deserts and to help minimize future crimes. 
Because these two theories-retributivism and consequentialism-
aim at two separate goals, they do not necessarily always coincide. 
Sometimes one goal may be satisfied only at the expense of another. 
Scholars have exploited this situation to argue for one theory over the 
other theory-as if one theory is correct and the other incorrect. The 
fact of the matter is that while retributivism and consequentialism 
certainly can come into conflict in very rare situations, they normally 
do not. On the contrary, if we are to explain and justify criminal 
punishment, the intentional infliction of harm, deprivation, or 
suffering-a state of affairs that is presumptively unjustified-we 
need both retributivism and consequentialism. 
In this Article, I have tried to show just why this is the case. 
One concept that links the two--however much both 
consequentialists and retributivists repudiate it-is revenge. The 
retributivist imperative of giving criminals their just deserts-
punishment-is itself largely motivated by our need to restore the 
moral and social order and thereby re-establish victims' emotional 
equilibrium. But fulfilling these needs-an excellent consequence-is 
191. See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 14, at 221-22 . 
192. See also Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad 
Samaritanism, 44 GA. L. REV. 607, 687-88 (2010) (arguing that punishment for bad 
Samaritanism should not be proportional to the gravity of the offense) . 
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a consequentialist goal. So beneath retributivism lies 
consequentialism. They are joined from the outset. 
They are also joined at the peripheries of criminal law. Some 
harmless acts are criminal, and therefore punishable, even though 
they do not arouse our vengeance. Retributivism, which is fueled by 
vengeance, does not explain and justify this kind of criminal 
punishment. It explains and justifies only criminal punishment of 
crimes that arouse vengeance- that is, harmful crimes and risky 
harmless crimes. We punish all the rest-all of the non-risky 
harmless crimes-strictly for consequentialist reasons. Still, just 
deserts is not entirely irrelevant here. Just deserts still comes into 
play not as the motivation for, or the justification of, punishment but 
rather as a means of determining proportional punishment. 
